"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [و‎‎١‎١‎٦] (٤٥٤/٢٣٦)

BRITISH DECISION TO ATTACK
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thousand men with six guns, but he believed that there was
still in the vicinity of Old Basra a large enemy force which
had not yet been engaged ; and a large hostile concentration
had just been reported as advancing from beyond South
mound.
At dawn on the 14th April, personal observation disclosed
to General Melliss that, although the immediate vicinity of
Shaiba was clear of the enemy, considerable hostile bodies
remained in the neighbourhood of South mound ; and, although
the exact whereabouts of the enemy’s main force was uncertain,
hostile bodies were still believed to be in the Old Basra area.
It seemed evident, however, that the enemy had been consider
ably shaken by his unsuccessful attacks and by our counter
strokes, and reports had been received of enemy withdrawals
to the north-west from Barjisiya wood. If this was true,
it was obviously desirable to follow the enemy up and if
possible inflict a crushing blow upon him before he could get
away; and it might prejudice General Melliss’ chances of
effecting this if he waited for the arrival of the rest of the
30th Brigade from Basra, as they would probably be delayed
should Old Basra be still in possession of the enemy.
General Melliss decided that he would move out to attack
the enemy with the greater part of his force, leaving only
two battalions (48th Pioneers and 104th Rifles) with three
field and two horse artillery guns to hold the camp. The
infantry took with them two hundred rounds of rifle ammuni
tion on the man and one hundred rounds per rifle on pack
mules. His first objective was to be South mound. After
this, it seems to have been in General Melliss’ mind that he
might have to clear Zubair and Old Basra of any enemy still
remaining there, but this, of course, would depend on how the
situation developed.
At 9.30 a.m. the force moved off, the 16th Infantry Brigade
directing the advance with its centre on a point just to the
west of South mound. The diagram below shows approxi
mately the positions of the units of the advancing troops.
The main reason for this special formation was the possibility
of an attack from the direction of Old Basra or Zubair.
Advanced cavalry patrols covered the front of the infantry,
and half a squadron was detached to watch the extreme
left flank.
The cavalry established contact with the enemy at a point
about a mile to the north-west of South mound, whence
enemy infantry were seen advancing from the direction of