"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [ظ‎‎١‎١‎٣] (٤٥٤/٢٣١)

204 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
the Zubair Gate of Basra, however, at about 7.30 a.m., it was
found that all the local boatmen had disappeared. This was
owing to the attack on Shaiba, whence the sound of heavy
artillery fire had been heard since daylight and where incidents
of the fighting could be seen through field glasses. General
Nixon, therefore, established his Force Headquarters for the
time at Zubair Gate.*
In consequence of messages from General Fry that he was
being attacked in force from the south, and that the enemy
were in occupation of Old Basra, General Melliss was ordered
about 8.15 a.m. to advance on Old Basra with the 30th Mountain
Battery and the 30th Infantry Brigade ; and General Fry
was asked to co-operate in the movement. This force moved
off about 9 a.m., by which time the artillery fire at Shaiba
had almost ceased ; some two hours later General Nixon
received a message from General Fry recommending that it
should withdraw to Basra. General Fry said that he could
only spare two battalions to co-operate with General Melliss
whose attempt to land at Old Basra would, he considered, be
very risky.
On receipt of this message, General Nixon sent an aide-de-
camp to General Melliss to acquaint him with General Fry’s
report of the situation and to ascertain if it were possible
for his force to move by a more direct route on Shaiba, so
as to facilitate co-operation from there. General Melliss
sent the aide-de-camp back with a message that the depth of
water prevented his taking a more direct route. General
Nixon thereupon decided that General Melliss’ troops should
remain where they were, as although they could not proceed
they would oblige the enemy to retain a force in opposition
to prevent a landing. By this time General Melliss’ advanced
guard was about a third of the way across the water,f which
came over the men’s knees. An hour or so later General
Fry reported that he was confident of being able to resist
all enemy attacks. General Nixon, therefore, decided to
withdraw General Melliss’ force to Basra and to send as many
n A British civil official at Basra describes the crowd of Basra inhabitants
ec e round the Zubair Gate and watching what they could see of the
opera ions. In early ail, he says, were ready and prepared with offerings,
c ’’ ° ^ cc I airn the Turks on their entry into Basra ; for, from the accounts
ey a received of the Turco-Arab numbers and preparations, they were
convinced that the British would be driven out of Basra. It was curious,
f watch the typically imperturbable attitude towards this crowd
° + th e 't' n u S j so ^* ers whose duty took them through it towards Shaiba.
T e orce had halted on a dry mound where General Melliss collected