"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎١] (٤٥٤/٢٠٧)

180 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
it was intended to create a diversion by landing a force at any
point in Turkish territory. On the 1st March the War Office
sent their reply. They estimated that a division of the 1st
Army Corps (a new formation of twelve battalions lately
arrived in Baghdad), the 35th and the 38th Divisions formed
the Turkish force in Mesopotamia ; the attack on the Dardan
elles, which was progressing favourably, would, in their opinion,
relieve the pressure on General Barrett; and they did not
anticipate that any further Turkish reinforcements would be
sent to Mesopotamia, either from the Caucasus front or from
elsewhere.
While this appreciation put the situation in Mesopotamia
in a better light, Army Headquarters in India were much
concerned at the lack of mobility on land of General Barrett’s
force. In reply to a query as to how he stood in this respect,
General Barrett had replied on the 28th that his land transport
amounted to 300 camels, 440 mule carts and 3,000 pack mules.
These were only just sufficient to supply Shaiba and did not
admit of any movement in force by land. This lack of trans
port had not hitherto been important, as all main movements
had been by river. General Barrett's efforts to obtain camels
locally had failed owing to lack of grazing and to the floods,
and he now considered that, for an advance on Nasiriya,
the best solution lay in a light railway for part or all of the
way. General Barrett was at once asked for any suggestions
he might have for improving the mobility of his force and for
a definite plan for a light railway.* He was also asked whether
he considered that the state of the country prevented any
Turkish advance in force on Basra, as it appeared to the
Chief of the General Staff in India that Force " D ” seemed
to be rather unduly dispersed to meet such an attack.
On the 3rd March, General Barrett replied that this dispersion
of his force had been only a temporary makeshift and that
it was now possible to reduce the Qurna garrison still further.
At the same time, he was obliged to retain posts on the Kanin
in view of the persistent reports of the Turkish intention to
advance by that flank. The Turkish main strength, however,
was on the Euphrates, where they must be confronted with
great supply and transport difficulties, and where orders were
The idea of such a light railway was not seriously considered at this
s age as a possible immediate project. The floods would make it impossible
v? construct for some months to come. Force “ D " could not advance
i reinforced considerably. There seemed small probability of this for some
ime, and it might then prove better to use the Euphrates river route and
to construct a good road to Zubair or Shaiba.