"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [و‎‎٩‎٩] (٤٥٤/٢٠٢)

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FLOODS ROUND QURNA 175
conference at Ruta to decide whether to attack Quma or
merely to leave a “ holding " detachment opposite it; and
two days later their decision could be inferred from the fact
that three Turkish battalions were said to have left, leaving
only five Arab and Kurdish battalions. On the 14th, a
widely extended force of some hundreds of Arabs advanced
from the north-west of Qurna, but would not face the fire of
our guns.
At this time also, a Turkish motor patrol boat was reported
to have entered the Hammar lake and to be threatening Arabs,
who had been friendly to us, with reprisals. On the ISthi
therefore, Generals Davison and Fry made a reconnaissance
up the Euphrates to select a position which would afford us
a closer control of the various water-ways * but they came
to the conclusion that the extent of the marshes and flood,
passable everywhere by the Arab mashuf, prohibited any
such idea.
On the 17th the issue became clear. The controlling banks
of the Tigris just above Muzaira’a were broken* in several
places and the water from the Shwaiyib river extended
westward to north of Muzaira a. The whole area round
Muzaira a became a sheet of water or a sea of mud, and the
area could evidently not be held for much longer/ All the
troops and several hundred Arab coolies were put on to combat
the inundations, but they had little effect; and General
Barrett reported to India on the 17th that he intended to
withdraw troops gradually from Qurna and Muzaira’a' to
Basra. Till the end of February the troops and Arabs laboured
at keeping the water within bounds, but then any idea of
holding Muzaira’a was abandoned. A pontoon bridge, con
necting Qurna with the left bank of the Tigris, constructed
by a bridging train sent from India, was completed by the 26th
February, and it was decided only to leave a detachment on
the left bank to guard the bridge-head. Troops had been
withdrawing daily and a new post was established at Kurmat
Ali, consisting of three heavy guns and a battalion of infantry,
to watch the “ new channel ” of the Euphrates.
The floods were also affecting the situation to the wesfof
Basra, the desert between there and Shaiba being under water,
in places to a depth of three feet. Camels could not travel
through these floods with their sticky, muddy bottom, and at
times even carts could not proceed. This made it very difficult
It is not certain whether this was done by hostile agency or caused by
the rough weather, but it was probably the latter.