"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [و‎‎٧‎٨] (٤٥٤/١٦٠)

VIEWS IN INDIA
135
The Viceroy, repeating this telegram to the Secretary of
State on the 25th, added, “ Before giving you my views I am
consulting the Commander-in-Chief and will formulate them as
soon as I know how far the proposal is feasible from a military
point of view.” On the 25th, the Chief of the General Staff,
India, sent orders to General Barrett to consolidate his position
at Basra and the head of the Persian Gulf, and he asked for
General Barrett’s appreciation of what he required to hold
Basra securely and to keep the control of the river as far up
as was necessary for that purpose. He also asked for further
information, on that and the next day, regarding the enemy,
the attitude of the Arab tribes, the number and capacity of
available steamers and lighters, the supplies and transport
locally procurable, and the state of the roads. In the mean
time and before he received General Barrett’s replies, he had
written a short appreciation from the military point of view
of Sir P. Cox’s proposal to advance on Baghdad. In this he
estimated that the disposable Turkish troops about Baghdad
did not exceed fifteen thousand, of whom not more than four
thousand would be properly armed, organised and equipped,
and that they would have sixteen to twenty guns. He pointed
out that it was essential that the Arabs should co-operate, and
that if they did so it might be possible for the one brigade
with horses and guns—which the available river transport was
believed to be capable of carrying in one trip to seize and
occupy Baghdad if sent promptly. The round trip would
probably take fourteen days, so that this brigade would have
to maintain itself unsupported at Baghdad for a fortnight.
He considered that eventually a division would have to be
kept in Baghdad “ to make the position even moderately
safe ” ; and another division would be required between
Baghdad and Fao, to secure the line of communication and
provide a reserve for Baghdad. This second division could
only be found by diverting a brigade from Egypt, sending one
brigade from the North-West Frontier* and making up a
composite brigade of troops from Muscat, China, Mauritius,
and from the Territorial Force. After taking into considera
tion the distance of Baghdad from Mosul and the Russian
operations in the Caucasus, he came to the conclusion that
these two divisions might be sufficient so long as Russia
occupied the Turkish armies in Armenia. In the event, how
ever, of a Russian repulse or snow in the Caucasus closing
* At this time it had been found necessary to reinforce the Wazinstan
area owing to an attack by a large body of tribesmen from across the frontier.