"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [ظ‎‎٦‎٧] (٤٥٤/١٣٩)

TT
114 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA
with the force in the Shatt al Arab had been much interrupted.
Steps were being taken to remedy this as far as possible, but
some days would have to elapse before better communications
could be assured. Owing to this and to the fact that General
Delamain had as yet little further to report, there was some
anxiety at the India Office. The failure of Force “ B ” to
effect a landing in face of opposition at Tanga in East Africa,
and the report of an impending attack on Muscat by Arab
insurgents had no doubt increased this anxiety; and on the
13th November, when telegraphing to know what instructions
had been given to General Barrett and to ask if the Arabs had
given any sign of their attitude towards us, the India Office
requested further information regarding events in the Gulf.
The Viceroy had already wired on that day informing the
Secretary of State that General Barrett was being instructed
to move on Basra if he considered his force strong enough to
do so, and to send a daily telegraphic progress report both
to India and to the Secretary of State. General Delamain’s
situation was described in a telegram from him, despatched
early on the 13th before he had received news of the arrival
of the reinforcements. He said, “ I have received several
reports that the Turks are now being reinforced and intend
to assume the offensive in combination with the Arab tribes.
Very heavy rain has made the country impassable. Military
situation* is uncertain as I do not yet know date of arrival of
remainder of division ” ; and he went on to say that he had
prepared a defensive position at Sanniya and that he proposed
to wait there till he got further information about the
reinforcements.
On the 13th, on his arrival off the Shatt al Arab and after
communicating with General Delamain, General Barrett gave
orders for his transports to proceed up the river to Sanniya
next day. Any idea of landing at Umm Qasr was abandoned
as it was necessary to concentrate at once to meet the reported
Turkish advance. As, however, only five river pilots were
available and as no lighters or tugs could be spared from the
work of disembarking troops to lighten the cargoes of two of
his transports, which were too heavy to cross the bar, only
a part of his force could be moved up at once. Five trans
ports (containing Divisional Headquarters, 63rd Field Battery,
17th Company Sappers and Miners, Norfolks, 7th Rajputs,
half the 120th Infantry, 48th Pioneers, and two squadrons 33rd
Cavalry) started up the river at 6 a.m. on the 14th and reached
Sanniya just before 11 a.m., when the work of disembarkation