"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [و‎‎٥‎٩] (٤٥٤/١٢٢)

INCEPTION OF THE OPERATIONS 97
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iment
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^ V ^ 10n A at thls stage would have undermined our relations
with the Arabs and put most of them definitely on the side
Tu ^ e y> with results that could not but be unfortunate for
U u + rUrkS ’ n ? oreove T went in other directions far beyond
what they must have known would be acceptable, for they
claimed that their territorial waters extended for six miles
to sea from the furthest projecting point of shore, and they
threatened to intern a British ship of war lying in the (Persian)
Rarun river unless she left within a week. A further compli
cation °J t he question was the news, from generally reliable
sources, that the Emden intended to make for Basra. Though
he Admiralty considered this an improbable contingency,
they could not ignore the repeated reports to this effect, and
they had to take precautionary steps to meet such a possi-
bihty—more espeaaUy in view of the fact that both the Odin
and the tspiegle would be far outranged by the Emden's
fu nS A^ T ° ^ urkish susceptibilities as far as possible,
the Admiralty had issued orders for one ship to remain in
ersian waters and for the others to stav outside territorial
waters beyond the recognised limit of three miles. More than
this could not be conceded, and the Turkish Government
were informed that we were prepared to discuss the question
in a friendly spirit if they would on their part recognise their
international obligations in regard to the German crews of the
Ooeben and the Breslau. The first portion of Force “ D ”
ett Bombay on the 16th, and its subsequent movements
and operations will be dealt with in the next chapter.
Little more remains to be told in this chapter. All reports
tended more and more to show that the war party in Turkey
were getting the upper hand. The German and Austrian
Ambassadors were increasing their efforts to involve Turkey,
and their officers, naval and military, were openly conducting
preparations for operations against Great Britain, while their
emissaries were uniting with those of Turkey in spreading
anti-British propaganda in every Musalman country in the
East In Mesopotamia, Arabs friendly to us were convinced
tliat Turkey was bent on war ; mines were reported to have
reached Baghdad on their way to Basra, more Turkish guns
were posted on the banks of Shaft al Arab, arrangements for
blocking the channel were repeatedly reported, and naval
and military reinforcements continued to pass unceasinglv
down the Tigris.
Q F B gins Sl ° OPS Were similarly armed with six 4-inch B.L. and four 3-pounder
( 6788 )