"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [و‎‎٥‎٥] (٤٥٤/١١٤)

INCEPTION OF THE OPERATIONS
89
been. The force proposed was only to hold Abadan or Moham-
merah, but the reinforcements were considered more than
sufficient to deal with any Turkish opposition south of Baghdad.
Subsequent events will show to what extent this opinion and
that regarding the summarised results to be expected from
the proposed action turned out to be correct. It must be borne
in mind that the available data on which this forecast was
based were meagre in the extreme, that the reservists forming
the Turkish forces at Basra had been reported to be ill-armed
and mutinous and that all reports on the Arabs were unanimous
as to their readiness to rise in revolt against the Turks ; while
if the physical difficulties of the country were not sufficiently
realised, it was felt that reports from the officer commanding
the landing force would enable us to rectify matters before
extended operations were undertaken.
This appreciation was seen by Lord Crewe and Lord Kitchener
and the former authorised the despatch of the following telegram
that evening (26th Sept.) to the Viceroy: “ The situation as
regards Turkey is most menacing and it may be necessary to
demonstrate at head of Persian Gulf. For this purpose 6 th
Division would suit admirably, but this should be kept absolutely
secret and no hint given of possible change of destination.
Should Cabinet decide to take this action one brigade of the 6 th
Division with two mountain batteries and Sappers should be
shipped at once as if they were urgently required for Egypt,
but with sealed orders to proceed to Shatt al Arab. Will
communicate further on this subject to-morrow. Pending this
take no action."
On the 28th the Viceroy was sent a further telegram referring
to that of the 26th and saying, “ The situation is still acute but
it is decided to take no action for a couple of days. Meanwhile
be prepared to act as proposed.” On that day a telegram was
received from the Viceroy reporting that the Political Resident
in the Persian Gulf had obtained copies of telegrams said to have
been sent by Enver Pasha in the latter half of July 1914 to
Ibn Saud warning him of the despatch of arms and ammunition
and of officers for training his Arabs, measures called for by
the imminence of war in Europe ; and other telegrams of about
the same period informing the Vali of Basra that the Turkish
Government was prepared to help Germany in return for
assistance received during Balkan War, that arms and ammuni
tion were being sent to Basra under the German flag and that
32 secret emissaries including German officers* were on their
Appendix I gives extracts from the diary of one of these German emissaries.