"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [و‎‎٥‎١] (٤٥٤/١٠٦)

INCEPTION OF THE OPERATIONS
(c) Certain other small detachments such as a battalion for
Bntlsh East Africa and a battalion for Mauritius.
{a) Certain Imperial Service forces for Egypt and British
East Africa.
This leaves us in India with only just sufficient troops to form
three infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade for the defence
of the Frontier. The Viceroy on the advice of the Commander-
in-Cmef say 3 this is sufficient for that purpose. Personally I
think this force is too weak, but they are responsible and we
must accept their estimate.*
It is clear from the above that India cannot spare another
man and therefore it only remains to consider how we can best
use the troops lent to the Imperial Government. Directly
war is declared we shall have a ferment in Egypt and at the
head of the Persian Gulf. As regards the former, we are
all right (here followed a statement of the troops reaching
^gypf)- As regards the head of the Persian Gulf the position
is very different. The oil tanks and installations in Abadan
island and the pipe-line from the oilfields are exposed to
mstant destruction. British interests at Baghdad and Basra
will be swept out of existence. Our allies the Shaikhs of
Mohammerah and Kuwait will be threatened and may con
sequently be either attacked or seduced, in which case all our
prestige and all our labours of years will vanish into air and our
position in the Gulf itself will become precarious Can we
avert this?"
He concluded that we ought to try ; and he suggested that
rorce “ B, consisting of one regular infantry brigade (one
British and three Indian infantry battalions) one Indian
pioneer battalion, three Imperial Service battalions and a
mountain battery, which was then ready to sail from Bombay
for East Africa, should be diverted to Abadan or Mohammerah.
There are some points in the above memoranda which
require at this stage certain consideration. At this period of
the war the Franco-British armies in France were still retiring
before the Germans, the naval situation was obscure, and there
was some anxiety regarding Turkish aims towards Egypt. The
following note by Mr. Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the
Admiralty, of the 1 st September, on a minute by the Naval
Staff urging the desirability of despatching troops to defend
the oil works, is some indication of the attitude of the authorities
i-hl Subseq u ent on the North-West Frontier, both during and after
W vf’ S that the Vicer °y and Commander-in-Chief accepted fully
their share of the great imperial risks at this period. F Y