"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [و‎‎٥‎٠] (٤٥٤/١٠٤)

INCEPTION OF THE OPERATIONS
79
political and other measures could be taken in the Persian
Gulf, Nejd and Yemen to create immediate diversion and secure
our ultimate position ; and on the same day the Admiralty
had sent telegraphic orders for H.M.S. Odin to watch the Mar-
mariss closely and to be prepared to engage her on receipt of
orders. The Odin and the Lawrence were then the only two
British Government vessels in the Persian Gulf and though
the Lawrence was a wooden paddle vessel with a few small
guns, the Odin was quite capable of dealing with the Marmariss.
The question was discussed by the India Office with the Foreign
Office and the Admiralty and resulted in the issue of orders,
on the 25th, to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, to
“ be prepared to send Odin and Lawrence at short notice to
Shatt al Arab in order to prevent any attempt at blocking and
if necessary stop transport of Turkish troops and stores by
water.” At the same time, the Admiralty recommended that
an expeditionary force should be prepared at Karachi to move
up the Gulf at the shortest notice and that a portion of this
force—they suggested two battalions of infantry and a moun
tain battery—should be sent to a position in the Persian Gulf
whence they could be moved into the Shatt al Arab in forty-
eight hours and would thus provide ample force for safeguarding
the oil refinery against attempts to interfere with it. The
matter was brought up at a Cabinet meeting, but it was still
hoped that the Turks would not precipitate hostilities and,
in view of the demand for men in France, it was considered
premature to divert troops from India for this purpose, so
long as all the force that could be spared from there were
likely to be more urgently required elsewhere ; and no final
decision was arrived at.
The news from Mesopotamia continued to be disquieting.
Some 2,000 Turkish troops were arriving at Basra and the
intention was, it was said, to send many towards Kuwait,
while the anti-British talk of Kuwaiti and other Arabs in
Basra—who were spreading reports of the revolt of Musalmans
in India and of an Afghan* invasion there—accentuated the
dangers of a situation which was leading the local consular
officials to consider arrangements for sending British women
and children away from Baghdad. Unfortunately this was
the season that the date crop was usually shipped, and the
unusual absence of British ships was causing unfavourable
* As a matter of fact, the Amir had by this time written to the Viceroy—-
expressing friendship for Great Britain and giving an assurance of his intention
to maintain neutrality.