"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [و‎‎٤‎٦] (٤٥٤/٩٦)

ARMY IN INDIA : PRE-WAR MILITARY POLICY 71
Turkish offensive ; that, having regard to the general principles
of strategy, the main theatre of operations in the West required
all available forces and that consequently detachments for
subsidiary purposes should be limited strictly to an absolute
minimum ; and that maintenance of security in the East was
legitimately and primarily a question for the Indian Army,
whose personnel were in many respects not too well adapted,
even if available, for employment in Europe.
In Europe and Asia Minor, operations against Turkey were
rendered difficult in the extreme owing to the absence of
communications in Thrace and Anatolia and to the lack of
suitable ports as bases of large operations, as well as to the
fact that the considerable Turkish forces grouped in these
areas would require the employment of a force larger than
we or the French could spare from the main theatre of opera
tions. The forcing of the Dardanelles, a project carefully
considered by the Admiralty and War Office some eight years
earlier, was then held to be a most difficult and dangerous
operation requiring action by a considerable combined naval
and military force for any measure of success; and it was
therefore ruled out. The General Staff favoured an attack
on, and occupation of, Alexandretta as the best means of
defending Egypt and helping Russia. Such an attack would
be a direct stroke at Turkish communications with Syria and a
menace to their communications with Mesopotamia ; combined
with feints elsewhere and the spreading of false reports, it
was considered that such an operation would oblige the Turks
to retain large forces about Constantinople and the Dardanelles.
This project, for which a scheme was worked out, was at first
agreed to by Lord Kitchener, but was abandoned when it
became the definite war policy to attack the Dardanelles
and when further military operations against Turkey in the
west were limited to a local defence of the Suez Canal, where
the natural physical difficulties, the absence of good communi
cations and the distances involved all combined to our advan
tage and to the disadvantage of the Turk.
With regard to Mesopotamia, the main corridor or line of
approach from Turkey to Persia and the Persian Gulf and
via Persia to Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier of India,
the principal broad results to be anticipated from Turkish
action were, firstly, an indirect menace to Egypt and the
Suez Canal from the Arabs ; secondly, interference with naval
oil supply from the Anglo-Persian oilfields; thirdly, the
embarrassment likely to arise from any disturbance of the