"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [و‎‎٤‎٥] (٤٥٤/٩٤)

ARMY IN INDIA : PRE-WAR MILITARY POLICY 69
definitely the extent to which India would “ be prepared tc
co-operate with the Imperial Forces by the despatch and
maintenance of reinforcements in the event of a serious war
breaking out in Europe in which Great Britain is involved."
At that time, however, the Army in India Committee was
still conducting its investigations and the draft was held over
pending the publication of its report, which was considered
likely to throw some light on the subject; the letter was
finally despatched to the India Office on the 31st July 1913
and forwarded by them to the Government of India, for an
expression of the latter’s views, on the 22nd August 1913.
After long and careful consideration, the Government of India
replied on the 30th July 1914 saying that under normal con
ditions the Army Council could rely on getting two divisions
and one cavalry brigade from India, which might be increased
under abnormal conditions and at some risk to India by another
division, but that such increase could not be counted on with
any degree of certainty. This reply was not received in
London till after the outbreak of war.
When war broke out with Turkey, the General Staff at the
War Office was fully occupied with the operations in Western
Europe the main theatre of operations. The number of
officers trained and qualified to deal with plans of operations,
involving large political and strategical issues, was strictly
limited. Most of them had accompanied the army in the
field, whose demands were generally the first to be met. A
reserve of such officers was almost totally lacking owing mainly
to the fact that a General Staff, in the modern sense of the
word, was a comparatively recent institution. Consequently,
it may be said that the conduct of a co-ordinated campaign
against Turkey under the proper auspices of a General Staff
was not possible, without recalling to London several officers
whose services were at the time required urgently in the field,
unless there were specially cogent reasons for such a course.
The duties of the General Staff in peace time include the
collection and collation of information concerning probable
theatres of operations and the preparation of projects, or plans,
for possible military operations in these theatres. Before the
war an arrangement had been come to between the General
Staff at the War Office and the General Staff at Indian Army
Headquarters allotting certain areas for which each would be
responsible as regards the collection and collation of information
(implying inferentially also the preparation of plans for opera
tions). Under this arrangement the General Staff in India