"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [و‎‎٣‎٩] (٤٥٤/٨٢)

ARMY IN INDIA : PRE-WAR MILITARY POLICY 57
arrangements unsatisfactory in the following main respects ;
the field army was insufficient having special regard to the
fact that the Home authorities could give no guarantee as to
the date of arrival of reinforcing troops* from England and
overseas , the numbers of troops allotted for internal security
were considered excessive in consideration of the improved
communications and the assistance that should be got from
the volunteers and police; the distribution of troops was
unsatisfactory, the number of small stations being too great
and the concentration of field army brigades being desirable,
while each divisional area ought to contain not only the field
army division but also the troops required for the internal
security of the area ; and munitions of war should be increased,
by the establishment of more local manufactures and the
accumulation of adequate reserves, to render India independent
of England for several months.
The scheme was drawn up primarily to meet the contingency
of war with Russia on or beyond the North-West Frontier,
and it marked a distinct advance in the organisation, command'
and training of the army. It was never completed. The
Anglo-Japanese alliance, the Russo-Japanese war, and the
Anglo-Russian convention altered the whole situation, and
Lord Kitchener himself, before he left India, acquiesced in,
if he did not initiate, a considerable reduction in military
expenditure and a relinquishment of part of the increases and
additions he had advocated in men, buildings, munitions and
stores.
The Army in India Committee of 1912 again reviewed
the whole military position having regard to the altered
situation, and their “ Majority Report" defined the conditions
governing the upkeep of the military force in India as follows :—
(|) Maintaining internal security and tranquillity.
“(ii) Being in a position to deal with the States and frontier
tribes which adjoin India, in so far as they may be
likely to be hostile.
“(hi) Being able, in the event of war with a great outside
Power, e.g., Russia, to hold our own pending
reinforcement from Home.”
They went on to rejectf the idea that it was “the duty
of the Government of India to maintain forces out of Indian
* This applied also to munitions.
t It is to be remembered in considering this question that India does not
enjoy the same unrestricted privileges of membership of the Empire as the
self-governing Dominions. f