"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. مجلد I" [ظ‎‎٢‎٦] (٤٥٤/٥٧)

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32 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
camps were at times substituted for the above depot formations
and the commanders in those areas were warned that they
were to keep the units up to strength by local recruitment.
At the end of August 1914 many of the depot battalions
were turned into regular battalions (forming in some cases
new divisions) and new depot battalions were formed (in some
cases three depot battalions for each regiment). In 1915 certain
changes took place in the system : all the reserve organisations
were placed under an Inspector-General; new depot units
were raised, training camps were formed and reserve regiments
created from them, enabling the organisation of more new
divisions ; and many of the depot regiments were sent to
various parts, among them the 11th being sent to Mosul.
Between 1915 and 1918 there was apparently no great change
in system.
Turkey’s strategical situation was such as to render her a
valuable ally to either side in the great war. The diplomatic
history of August to October 1914 shows that Germany, how
ever confident of the result she may have appeared, attained no
easy success: to ensure it she probably found herself obliged
to involve Turkey in those definite acts of hostility which
eventually precipitated the crisis. If it is permissible at this
stage of history to hazard such an opinion it is that, in any
circumstances, Turkey would not—owing to her geographical
position—have been able to maintain her neutrality throughout
the war. Securely astride the most important ice-free sea
access of Russia to Europe and her allies, thus depriving both
of the means of drawing on the other for supplies, reinforce
ments or munitions, Turkey at the same time threatened Great
Britain’s main line of communication with India and Australasia.
The Turco-German plans of operations in special relation
to the Mesopotamian campaign can still only be surmised
from the insufficient material as yet available, and deductions
or conclusions now arrived at can consequently not be regarded
as in any way final or accurate. The initial main concen
trations of the Turkish army appear to denote that no opera
tions on a large scale or of decisive importance were expected
in Mesopotamia.*
* Ihe 1st Army of five army corps was around Constantinople in European
Turkey ; the 2nd Army of two army corps was in Asia Minor but also partly
round Constantinople ; the 3rd Army of three army corps was concentrating
towards the Caucasus; the Yemen army corps and the Asir and Hejaz
divisions remained in their usual areas ; and of the two army corps normally
in Mesopotamia, the bulk was withdrawn to Syria and to Erzerum. See
Appendix VI, p. 352.