ملف ١٩١٧/٧٥٦ الجزءان ٢-٣ "النشرات العربية أرقام ٦٦-١١٤" [ظ‎‎١‎٠‎٢] (٨٣٤/٢١٣)

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heartened the Emirs have succeeded in maintaining their irregulai
forces 'at about the original pitch, notwithstanding tlie nomad s
atute distaste for sustained action and winter campaigning The
grievance however, that some of the tribesmen m the field, and
more a who are behind the front, nurse about their pay and
subsidies is growing with time Large as is our allowance to
Kinir Husein, and liberally as he appropriates it to his sons
armies, it cannot pay for both the fighting forces and those who
are not needed to fight. The King’s policy is to pay only those
Bedouins actually fighting, or necessary to the army because it
operates in their territory, or likely to be needed for future
fighting He, therefore, incurs the reputation of neglecting former
helpers and friends, such as the Harb, who were so necessary to
him a year or more ago when the scene of operations lay on the
Medina-Rabegli roads. Some clans of this tribe have already
retaliated for his neglect by stopping and looting the Southern army s
supplies, and as Emir Abdullah, who dislikes the Harb, and lavours
their Ateibah enemies, is not likely to call out the former tribesmen
again for service, we shall probably hear more of their besetting
the Medina roads and inciting others to help embarrass King
Husein at home.
The enemy’s long L. of C. is still not cut definitely, though,
as stated above, it has almost ceased to be of practical service to
the Turks, at any rate south of el-Ala. Nowhere as yet,
however, have the Arabs held on for more than three days, at
the outside, to any station or other point captured on the line,
nor have they wrecked any of the larger bridges. YV hen at last
a definite cut is made, it is more likely to be north of Maan than
south. Immediately ahead of what may be regarded as the
Arabs’ main offensive front, the Wadi el-Hasa line, the position
is, that the rural Kerak Arabs, both Moslem and Christian, have
openly come over to the Sherifial side, and are ready to co
operate at once in a further move of Feisal’s army northward.
But the Mujaliyah, who are dominant in the town of Kerak
itself, still sit on the fence, while Emir Zeid, who is in command
of Feisal’s advance force, hesitates to advance, deterred partly
by the continued cold, partly by nervousness about operating in
a new country under conditions unlike those of Arabia proper,
but most of all by the natural inertia and weakness of purpose
which he shares with some of his brothers. Hence the delay
which has succeeded the successes at Tafila and Wadi el-Hasa.
It is especially to be regretted, because a strong force of the
Beni Sakhr is willing and ready to operate in the Arab cause
n° r th of Kerak again, and Bedouin forces should be used, when
ready, without more procrastination that} can be avoided.