"ملاحظات عن الجيش الإيراني" [و‎‎٩] (٧٠/١٧)

3
In 1925 the Conscription Act was passed by the Majlis, which pro
vided universal military service for two years by all male subjects of
Persia reaching the age of twentyone, subject to the usual exemptions.
After his accession to the throne in 1926, Reza Shah continued to
be Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Ministry of War being under
his personal supervision. Further reorganisations were made as the
army grew until prior to the present war the strength was approximately
105,000 all ranks, consisting of nine infantry divisions, five independent
composite brigades, one independent composite garrison and one
mechanised brigade.
In the spring of 1940 it was decided to increase the strength of the
army from nine infantry divisions to sixteen infantry and one cavalry
division, but subsequent to the trade agreement which was signed with
Russia in March 1940 it is believed that the expansion scheme w T as
postponed or discarded. The additional divisions at present (Aug.
1940) average only about 4,000 men each.
The value of the present Iranian army for war is difficult to assess.
During the last fifteen years troops have operated successfully in many
engagements with the tribes, and have been instrumental in carrying
out the Shah’s policy of tribal disarmament. Such operations, how
ever, have only involved comparatively small concentrations. Even
under such conditions administrative arrangements have been bad,
or even non-existent, and moreover much of the fighting was done by
Amnieh or local levies, rather than by the regular troops. A large
army has never yet been put in the field for operations against a foreign
country, and owing to lack of administrative services and shortage
of transport, great difficulty is likely to be experienced in maintaining
in the field a force larger than three or four divisions.
There is a considerable amount of modern equipment, but a lack of
qualified technical personnel. Maintenance is poor.
There is a shortage of officers, and tactical training is of a very
low standard.
Whether the Iranian army would resist hostile aggression is open
to doubt. Without help from abroad it will be widely argued that
there is no point in angering the invader— e.g., Russia, and exposing
the population to his fury, by putting up a resistance which could only
be futile. Given good propaganda, good leadership and training,
however, the material is there.