ملف رقم ٣٣٧٢ لسنة ١٩١٦ الجزء ٢ "الجزيرة العربية: السياسات الفرنسية والإيطالية" [و‎‎٢‎٢‎٧] (٤٩٨/٤٦٢)

SECRET.
B. 247.
BRITISH INTERESTS IN ARABIA.
It is understood that a memorandum is desired, explaining why the
exclusion of Italy from Western and Southern Arabia and the Red Sea
littoral is important in British interests.
1. 1 he importance of Arabia from its geographical position, lying along
two of the main approaches to India, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, is a
commonplace. iNio part of the country can he completely indifferent to
(Ireat Britain, who is the only Power that at present has a foothold in the
country. Our hold is limited to a narrow fringe along the coast, from Aden
to Koweit; its security depends ultimately upon the tranquillity of the
interior. Since w r e are unable to intervene in, or control, the interior, it is
essential to exclude all possible seeds of disturbance.
2. Arabia is not a State in any effective sense, but a fortuitous concourse
of tribes—more or less settled in the fertile regions near the coast, elsewhere
wandering—under Chiefs, the limits of whose sway are determined, not by
frontiers, but by the tribes w T hich they for the time being control. Their
politics are closely interwoven, and a quarrel may run right across the
continent. With the tribes and Chiefs along the coast mentioned v'e have
treaty relations.
3. In addition to this we occupy at Aden an area of 75 square miles
with a considerable hinterland, the frontier of which, with the Yemen, has
been demarcated. The Chiefs within this frontier are -under our protec
torate.
4. The strategical importance of Aden need not be emphasised. 1 he
ortress of Aden is almost impregnable against tribal forces. In circum-
Tances as they existed before the war we could hold it with a very small
'orce, and control the protectorate by means of prestige and subsidies.
5 The Vden-Yemen frontier is a frontier quoad the Turks, not quoad
;he Arabs, who do not greatly respect it. Its demarcation was necessitated
aro-elv by the intrigues of our semi-independent neighbour the Imam of
Sanaa whom the Turks encouraged when it served their purpose, but could
lever effectively control whei he chose to defy them. But we had recognised
Turkish authority, and whenever some petty local indent owirred t ie only
remedy was representations at Constantinople. Ihe Imam has pretty
^tensive claims on our side of the frontier—indeed, they extend to he
Hadramaut tribes on the coast the other side of the protectorate To the
i i anat whprc the frontier has not been demarcated, vt arc
aorth and ^ast^e^^ltom ^ ^ ^ and by our treaty
3i l7Y w tl hie SuHan of Shehr and Mokalla, which, however, suffice
ord? so long as the tribes of the Hadramaut hinterland are not tampered
A Q Aden is the gateway of a considerable
0. In addition to hci 0 }‘’f ove t \ ie wa r about 300,000h per annum),
land trade with the \emen (\ Adell t0 Taiz— desirable for political
sa. - **■ - -
trade it already possesses. _ • , p i rh»
i - v T+olIon omhitions are mainly nxecl. ine
7. It is the A emeu on ^ . ^ g c elf and w p en the Turk is ejected from
Yemen is as little a unity as, _ j t qq ie Jdrisi, we know, will claim
Arabia it will fall to no one Arab master.