خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠٠(٢) "بلاد فارس: الوضع قبيل احتلال الحلفاء، وما بعده" [و‎‎٣‎٠‎٢] (٦٠٦/٦٠٣)

Ext. 3619/41.
SECRET.
XXX
Cypher telegram from Secretary of State
to Government of India, External Affairs
Department, repeated to H.A. Minister,
Kabul, dated 25th June 1941.
(Number of groups'441).
IMPORTANT.
7305.
German attack on Russia has introduced entirely new
element into situation which affects our whole policy in Central
^sia. It is necessary to consider our attitude towards this
development with particular reference to Afghanistan and
Sinkiang. It is, of course, too early as yet to guess how the
situation may develop but the -following points have occurred to
us as arising for immediate consideration:-
■Lg.), xU?ghanistan. Attack on Russia removes for the time being
at any rate danger ^ of Russian aggression on Afghanistan v/hich
has alv/ays been main obsession of the Afghan Government. At
the same time possibility of German trade with Afghanistan is
practically excluded except through very long and uncertain
route via Iran and Turkey. These two factors should incline
the iAghans towards closer co-operation with ourselves if we
play our cards well though no doubt the desire to re-insuro
against the possibility of a German victory will be a powerful
influence on the other side and the .Afghans may well show a
tendency to sit on the fence till they see more clearly how
Russia stands up to the German attack. The cessation of trade
with Germany and the impossibility of her supplying material
lor bridges or plant for factories etc. will mean that the
raison d etreof the majority of German nationals in
^ gnanistan will disappear and will afford us an opportunity to
press for their departure and in view of the economic
stranglehold v/hich we and Russia will now have on alfghan trade
we might well make it an essential -condition of cny further
economic assistance which we give to her that action is taken
ao once to cut down the number of Germans in the country. It
,,would be .necessary in that case that we should be prepared to
joffer technical experts of our- own to take their place. The
method of approach to the Afghans on this subject will require
careful consideration but the essential point no doubt is to
avoid any suggestion of exerting pressure in combination with
Russia. Thismight well frighten the Afghans into keeping
m with the Axis as re-insurance against what they might
regard as a combined threat to their independence. Note to be
struck might be to stress statements in Prime Minister’s
broadcast 22nd June that H.M.G. have no greater liking than
hitherto for Communism but that any man or State who fights
against Nazism will have our aid. I shall be glad to receive
your views_and those of Fraser-Tytier on these suggestions and
on the position generally.
•Oh). Iran. A somewhat similar situation arises here also
except that Iran is in more immediate danger from a German
Victory and we^have not the same hold on the Iranian Government
and little toeffer them. Our main purpose will be to stiffen
their morale and their will to resist a throat to their
independence. H.M. Minister in Tehran is being asked for his
views upon the situation.
» Fact that we are now fighting alongside Russia
might, afford opportunity to seek with some prospect of success
an improvement in the position of our Consul-General at Kashgar
and in the treatment of British subjects generally. To promote
4
this/