خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠٠(٢) "بلاد فارس: الوضع قبيل احتلال الحلفاء، وما بعده" [و‎‎٢‎٩‎٤] (٦٠٦/٥٨٧)

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The External Department may like to have the following
comments on the. Government of India’s telegram No.3389 of Sthf^^pw*
July regarding our policy towards Persia. ^ _A
2, I think that we have certain very valuable economic
weapons with which we could bring to bear pressure upon Persia,
in particular in regard to the following commodities:-
(a) Sugar - Persia normally imports large quantities of sugar
and is at present dependent for her supplies on Java, Russia and
India. A contract for the supply of 30,000 tons of Java sugar
has just been completed by the United Kingdom Commercial -
Corporation, but the contract does not bind us to provide shipping.
It must be borne in mind as regards sugar that if the Germans
obtain control over Russia they could supply Iran with Russian
sugar.
(b) Tea - Iran is a very big consumer of tea, for supplies of
which she is dependent on India, the Netherlands East Indies and
Ceylon. She is trying to obtain through the U.K.C.C. large
quantities of tea from India, but no big contract has yet been
signed.
(c) Wheat - The Iranian Government recently, very foolishly,
turned down some wheat cargoes which had been diverted from
Greece and which we offered them. They did this because their
own harvest was becoming available and because they were expecting
large supplies from Russia. It is however understood that their
own harvest is not a good one, and it is presumably possible that
the Russians will want all their wheat to keep their Army in the
field. It is therefore very likely that in the Autumn Persia
will De desperately in need of wheat. Here again, as in the
case of sugar, if Germany obtain control of Russia she could
probably keep Persia supplied with some Russian wheat.
(d) Lorries and tyres - Internal transport in Persia is largely
dependent on an adequate supply of lorries. We can cut these off
in co-operation with the United States and we are already asking
them to give shipping priority to India’s requirements of
chassis^ which will probably have the effect of cutting off Persia’s
supplies in any case. Even if Germany was able to keep Persia
supplied with lorries in answer to an embargo by us we could
withhold tyres and thus make the German lorries useless. Persia's
ireports of tyres are at present being reduced to a minimum.
(e) Persia has bought about 100,000 tons of steel rails for the
Tehran-Tabriz Railway. These are of course not economically
important to Persia, but if they werp cut off this would have
considerable effect on the Shah’s ffiffffiyfrt attitude.
(f) Cement - Persia is in the market for considerable quantities
of cement, probably also in connection with the Tehran-Tabriz
Railway. A contract for supplies from India has just been made
by the U.K.C.C. If the Germans obtain control over Russia they
might be able to keep Germany supplied with Russian cement.
3. The above are the commodities which we can either withhold
from the Persians or allow them to have as we wish. The Persians
also/