خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠٠(٢) "بلاد فارس: الوضع قبيل احتلال الحلفاء، وما بعده" [و‎‎٢‎٧‎٠] (٦٠٦/٥٣٩)

Draft Paper
Department
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not in any case arrive for some months and can if
necessary be cancjelled or diverted, thus giving a
handle for increaising pressure on Shah (see paragraph
2 of your telegram No. 3435 of the 9th July). H.M. G.
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entirely aopreciate the Government of India’s views
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as to menace of possible German arrival on the
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Caucasus and consequent importance of taking steps to
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limit toy addition ^ the military potentialities of
countries such as Iran and Afghanistan.
They have no
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intention of lettjing Iranian Government have aircraft
or bther military supplies uhless their conduct is
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fully satisfactory and military considerations permit.^
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In the case of locomotives there is another consideration
and that is the importance of Trans-Iranian Railway for
transport of materials for Russia through Iran should
the Vladivostok route be interfered with and it may be
necessary to take sonle risks/to maintain and increase
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the" capacity of this line. 1- should nuL, Trow ever, be
in-favour -enlistting; any lorrieo--through Per-thic
purpose.
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If I haVe not fully comprehended the
respects in which; your views on this question differ
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fronr line being pursued by H.M.G., I shall be glad if
you will elucidate them further.
(10337) Wt.U0j4/P.164 10,000 5/39 A.& E.W.Ltd. Gp.685
(11764) Wt.26696/P.282 10,000 9/39