خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠٠(٢) "بلاد فارس: الوضع قبيل احتلال الحلفاء، وما بعده" [و‎‎٢‎٣‎٨] (٦٠٦/٤٧٥)

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Department.
3 .
H.M.G.’s conclusion is therefore that economic
sanctions would l(>e slow in producing results and that
such results as ^vere produced might not be favourable
to our interests
ensuring that we
the German colony must depend on the feasibility of
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The whole problem therefore of
succeed in securing the expulsion of
military measure$ in conjunction with the Russians.
This question has now been considered by the Chiefs of
Staff and you will no doubt have seen the telegram from
the War Office to the Commander-in-Chief India of the
25th July No.80081. This indicates that the necessary
forces could be made available but it would not be
possible to start military action before the second
week in August, Meanwhile the Minister at Tehran is
being instructed to speak to the Iranian Government on
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the lines he proposes in Pairfc ITI 'of his telegram No.
454 of the 22nd July.
4. As regard^ your telegram No,3710 of the 22nd
July, H.M.G. feel that this seems to indicate a complete
misreading of the position due partly no doubt to the
fact that it was despatched before study of all the
relevant telegrams. They desire to make it clear that
there has never been any question of appeasement in the
policy adopted towards Iran but it has been essential,
before embarking on any action which might result in
hostilities, to make sure that the necessary forces
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were available t<t> deal with any enemy reactions.
As the Government of India must be well aware, there
were barely sufficient forces in Iraq for local
requirements and it was clear that to obtain the
necessary forces: troops would have to be moved from
elsewhere in the Middle East. Until this fundamental
question/