خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠٠(٢) "بلاد فارس: الوضع قبيل احتلال الحلفاء، وما بعده" [ظ‎‎٢‎١‎٠] (٦٠٦/٤٢٠)

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be giving nothing away since rumours are already rife and
everyone assumes from your statement that some action must
I oil ow non-compliance by the ^'Iranian* Government with our
demands.
x I? ^ ra -0- Government wish to make parallel
representations to the Iranian Government I think they should
be allowed to do so.
. ., military action is taken much will depend on its
initial success especially against the Iranian air force,
ine public will no doubt fear air reprisals and if they took
place, especially against Bagdad, feeling would run strongly
against us and there might be trouble. Otherwise I should'
overt action against us or any interference
milr secnirity movements on the part of [grp. undec. ] population,
ihe influential Ulema might attempt to make trouble with the
Euphrates tribes in the Holy Cities. They might cause some
trouble but they are unarmed. The Iranian Government might
attempt to send Iraqi officers in Iran to Iraq in order to
corrupt the army but I doubt if they would succeed and I
question whether the army would obey the orders.
, The above views are based on the supposition that we
- e a 2Qylicence of the Iraqi Government in cur action.
C 1 tbeir attitude is lukewarm, enemy propaganda will of course
have a much greater effect. They would probably resign rather
°PP? se actively and in that case a serious situation
would arise. I think however that there is a good prospect
of gaming them and I should like to start at once.
"!^ e Intention of His Majesty’s Government to
announce, if military action is taken, that’ we have no designs
on the territorial integrity of Iran? I ask because it is
not impossible that the Iraqi Government might ask in return
^Khuzistan^ U ^° r ^ ^ ex ^ ens I° n their territory into
9. I shall be glad of any information as to probable
reaction m Turkey. F
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