خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠٠(٢) "بلاد فارس: الوضع قبيل احتلال الحلفاء، وما بعده" [و‎‎٢‎١‎٠] (٦٠٦/٤١٩)

AW P^eX
With tfifl ir j .
Under See 3
tep Foreign
Mi .
(This telegram is of particular secrecy and should he retained
mr t. hp ant hrir'-i coH -i ^ ^4- ^ ^ ^ \
5 A«fi 1941
i>rt(
Pa// t>y the authorised recipient and not passed on.)
Acx}s^)
Ud. * AMMDED COPY .
• [Cypher. ] DEPARTJlW r PAL (SECRET)
FROM BAGDAD TO FOREIGN OFFICE .
Sir K. Cornwallis.
No. 870 .
2nd August, 1941.
D.
R.
12.55 p.m., 2nd August, 1941.
10.35 p.m. , 2nd August, 1941,
Repeated to Foreign Simla No. 303
Cairo No. 355
Tehran No. 184.
IMMEDIATE -
SECRET .
Your telegram No. 702.
I * ' •
r, difficult to foresee' the exact effect in this country
ol military action against Iran (Persia) without first sounding
various prominent Iraqis, _ My impression is that the first
reaction would not be hostile. Rumours of our intention to
advance into Iran have been current for over a week and have
^ n 5 rea ^ ec ^ sin £? your statement in the House of Commons on
Wednesday. The effect so far reported has been favourable
because the Iranian is heartily, disliked. Possible implications
nave o not however been thought out nor has Nazi propaganda yet got
+v . , ..^.5 an P?^ Jo^etell the reaction of [grp. undec. Is. I
think individually they would be pleased but Iran would no doubt
make an appeal under *Saadabad* Pact and their attitude might be
influenced by that of the other signatories. *
, ..§• ^ seems to me therefore very important that our demand
pe presented persuasively and at once. I suggest that we
should take the line that we have evidence that the ° —
5mans are
trying to set up in Iran the same kind of fifth column organisa-
tion as they set up in Iraq with the help of Rashid Ali and that
rneir object is^firstly to dominate Iran *in order to use^ ; it as
a base for ^Iraqis now there, and secondlv, if they defeat Russia,
to attack Iraq through Iran’ Their plans are thus an’even
greater danger to Iraq than to Great Britain. As was the case in
wo months^ago action will be necessary to prevent fulfilment
oi these plans if Iranian Government will not itself eradicate
uerman influence and we count upon the support of the Iraqi
Government m dealing with the matter which affects us both.
^ f- I suggest that a communication on these lines should be
aomp P?rp^+ Government > and that extensive propaganda to the
me 2- tloni ng the possibility of action) should
be started in the near future throughout the country in order to
forestall the inevitable German propaganda movement; We should