خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠٠(٢) "بلاد فارس: الوضع قبيل احتلال الحلفاء، وما بعده" [و‎‎١‎٠‎٦] (٦٠٦/٢١١)

Prom Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to
Secretary of State for India.
Dated Bahrain 18.00 hours, 23fd August, 1941.
Received 20.00 hours, 23rd August, 1941.
SECRET
13114.
4/Vt
IM PORTANT . WWW
T/462 . Addressed to Government of India Simla
to Tehran and Secretary of State for India Senior Naval Officer,
Persian Gulf from Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. We now
appear on verge of war with Persia. However much v/e may wish to
limit hostilities to areas selected by us (? it is) unlikely even
if Persians were agreeable that their German advisers would allow
them to cooperate. I feel we should be prepared for this and
make plans accordingly.
2. The following questions require very earl?/ answers.
(a) At present we have been refused permission to evacuate
British subjects official or non-official or to warn them to leave.
In fact our silence has (? lulled) them into false security since
question of military intervention has been subject of open
discussion for last fortnight, I believe British subjects both
official and non-official v/ill be running grave risks after
hostilities commence. Is any attempt to be made to extricate them?
Persia will be unmoved by any threats of retaliation against their
subjects in India and elsewhere.
(b) Will Persians outside Persia be treated as enemies? It
would be impracticable to take any action against the large and
friendly colony on this coast. A few individuals long established
in Bahrain are taking out Bahrain nationalisation papers.
(c) Is trade with minor Persian ports to continue? Bahrain
depends on them for important food-stuffs and only alternative (and
far more costly) source would be India with added burden for British
bottoms.
(d) I presume Senior Naval Officer will instruct steamers if and
when they should cease to call at Persian ports? Please confirm.
(e) Since we have omitted to warn British subjects of their
danger I presume they will be compensated for their losses? Inter
alia the Persian Government will probably add to their difficulties
by threatening their servants.
S. We appear to have only two weapons against Persia - a rapid
advance and control of their petrol supply. After Iraq and Syria
the first appears unlikely ($ and) one can only hope that they will
recognise the second at the outset and yield to it.
MOe.POL.DCp,.,
25AUG)941 I
INDIA OFFICE