"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد II." [و‎‎٢‎٧‎٤] (٦٦٠/٥٥٦)

APPENDIX XXL
i.e., Woolpress Village.
Telegram.—From General Aylmer to Generals Lake and
T ownshend.
17th February 1916.
VERY SECRET.
It is impossible for me from existing data to estimate exact strength or
distribution of enemy s forces. Any day may bring important information
tending to alter existing views. I am now inclined to view that the Turks
have still very considerable strength at Hanna. There are, however, some
indications that troops are being transported from left bank to right bank
Tigris at Maqasis by barge and rafts there. There would apparently be
no reason for such transfer unless such troops were being sent back from
Hanna. Other available troops would certainly move to Es Sinn right
bank position by Turkish bridges over Tigris and Hai. It seems to me
that the great advantage which the Turks think that they have is in being
able to keep our shipping at 25 miles from Kut, forcing us to adopt the plan
of long march across country by right bank, using land transport. They would
be foolish to endanger such an advantage by unduly weakening the Hanna
position. Therefore, I do not think that they are likely to reduce Hanna
garrison below 7,000 or 8,000 men. On the other hand, any marked success of
ours at Es Sinn right bank would have such a moral effect as might induce
them to withdraw definitely altogether. It is also in many ways to
our advantage to keep the enemy strong at Hanna, which we can do by
demonstrating against him there so that the numbers he can keep in reserve
at Shumran, and consequently send to Es Sinn right bank position as
reinforcements when we attack it, may be minimised.
The distribution of tents as seen by aeroplane reconnaissance would appear
to indicate one strong division besides cavalry and guns at Es Sinn right
bank and on Hai near Turkish bridge. I am pretty sure that the Turks
anticipate an advance by us on right bank and see that we must turn their
right flank, as they are strongly entrenching a line from the Sinn Abtar
redoubt, which is three miles from the Tigris, almost due south for two miles
back to a strong redoubt which they are constructing on a mound. They have
also constructed a bridgehead on north of Hai, where their bridge is.
It seems to me most probable the combined difficulties of moving reinforce
ments from Baghdad and of keeping their forces to the east of Kut
supplied will prevent them from placing more than a strong division with
cavalry and guns in the Es Sinn right bank position except at a critical
moment for a short time. Hence any troops they have over, after providing
for the garrison of Hanna and a strong division at Es Sinn right bank
position, must remain at Shumran or encircling Kut to north or the
Liquorice Factory* to the south-west of that place. Agents’ reports indicate
a new division having arrived at Baghdad about 7th instant and being delayed
there. Even if this is exaggerated, it would appear that the Turks may
obtain further reinforcements any day at or about Shumran, but it seems to
be somewhat improbable that they will be posted further to the east at once
on account of supply and transport difficulties. They will also be influenced
in keeping back a strong reserve by the doubt as to which bank it will have
to be sent. Hence in the immediate future we may, I think, anticipate
a distribution of troops somewhat as follows :—
Hanna, 7,000 to 10,000 infantry ; Sinn, 8,000 infantry ; Shumran and
Kut, remainder. The maintenance of the Kut blockade will probably
absorb about 5,000 of the remainder, so that their reserve for active operations
would not exceed their total force minus 20,000 or 23,000. Their total strength