"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد II." [ظ‎‎١‎٦‎٥] (٦٦٠/٣٣٩)

296 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA
on the soldier ; and his advance would probably take nl
just after the middle of February, when his reinforcement 6
had arrived. The probable strength of his force on the right
bank would then be 12,000 rifles, with strong artillery and
the cavalry brigade ; and co-operation by the Kut garrison to th
fullest extent possible was essential. The best way of ensurin 6
this must depend on the developments during the next ter
days and General Townshend was to consider most carefully tb
necessary arrangements. General Aylmer then entered int)
the different alternatives, which do not directly concern tlfs
narrative as the necessity for them did not arise; but thev
are given with General Townshend’s reply in Appendix XX*
A brief reference is now necessary to operations on the
Euphrates, whence a detachment had been despatched as
described before, to demonstrate up the Hai. Just before
handing over command to General Brooking, General Gorringe
had reported that the tribes round Shatrat al Muntafik had
expressed their determination to oppose a British advance up
the Hai and he was consequently of opinion that a withdrawal
from Butaniya, where the main detachment was encamped,
might have a bad effect unless preceded by an advance. On
the 28th January General Lake instructed General Brooking
to withdraw the Butaniya detachment when weather and
political conditions appeared favourable.
General Brooking finally decided that the withdrawal
should take place on the 7th February. The detachmentf at
Butaniya was about 1,600 strong with 6 mountain guns under
Brigadier-General E. C. Tidswell, commanding the 34th Brigade.
No severe tribal pressure upon the withdrawal was anticipated;
but for the sake of safety. General Brooking sent out from
Nasiriya a detachment^ of about 1,300 troop>s with 4 guns to
a position half-way between Nasiriya and Butaniya to support
the withdrawal.
As soon as General Tidswell started his retirement (about
8.30 a.m.), large numbers of Arabs began to harass the force and
were joined gradually by contingents of Arabs from villages—
supposed to be friendly—along the route. But they caused
the British no undue losses until General TidswelTs detachment
* Further details concerning his plans for co-operation are given by General
Townshend in the appendix of “ My Campaign in Mesopotamia.”
t One squadron, 12th Cavalry ; half battalion, 2nd Queen’s Own RoyalWest
Kent Regiment; l/5th Queen’s Royal Regiment (West Surrey); H4th
Mahrattas ; 30th Mountain Battery.
t One squadron, 33rd Cavalry ; 1 /2nd Sussex Battery, R.F.A.; 44th
Infantry ; half 90th Punjabis.