"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد II." [ظ‎‎١‎٤‎٨] (٦٦٠/٣٠٥)

264 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA
sound and he considered that any abandonment of Kut with
guns and stores would be disastrous to our prestige and quite
uncalled for. General Nixon at the same time approved of
General Aylmer’s plan for an advance with a portion of his
force on the right bank and he hoped that conditions would
admit of an early start.
With these instructions before him, General Aylmer felt
that he had no alternative but to attempt to carry the Hanna
position by an assault as early as possible.
On the 19th January General Nixon handed over his com
mand in Mesopotamia to Lieutenant-General Sir P. H. Lake*
and sailed from Basra. By his ability, determination and the
confidence he inspired in his force—and after overcoming very
great difficulties with limited means—General Nixon had
achieved unbroken success during his first six months’ operations
in Mesopotamia ; and this at a period when no other British
force in any theatre of war could make the same boast. At
the end of this period General Nixon had found himself with
his advanced force well on the road to Baghdad and with only
the broken remnant of a frequently defeated Turkish force to
bar his further progress. He was aware that the capture of
Baghdad was deemed to be politically desirable and it appeared
to him that he would be to blame if he missed the opportunity
which circumstances appeared to offer him. He failed. On
the one hand it has been said that his plan was “ based on
political and military miscalculations and attempted with tired
and insufficient forces and inadequate preparations."f On
the other hand, there are those who were on the spot and in a
position to judge who say that it was only through sheer bad
fortune that he failed to achieve his object. It is no concern of
this narrative to offer an opinion ; but it may well point out
that, as war is not an exact science, no commander has ever
achieved great military success without incurring risks and
committing mistakes ; that General Nixon had undoubtedly
displayed many of the qualities of a great commander; and
that owing to the breakdown of his health at a critical stage
he was never given the opportunity to retrieve his failure and
re-establish his reputation. As Lord Hardinge told the
Mesopotamia Commission, in paying a tribute to General
Nixon’s work—and Lord Hardinge had greater facilities
* General Lake had been Chief of the General Staff in India and had been
in close touch with the operations in Mesopotamia since their inception. Hn
was also well acquainted with the situation in India and the East generally
and knew the policy of Government.
t “ Mesopotamia Commission Report.”