"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد II." [ظ‎‎١‎٨] (٦٦٠/٤٣)

14
HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA
on Baghdad at this time is further disclosed in his private
weekly letter of the 8th October to Mr. Chamberlain, in which
he said that unless they could get Indian troops from Egypt his
own feeling was that we should remain at Kut, although he
knew that the military authorities were thirsting to push on
and he fully realised the immense political effect the capture of
Baghdad would have in the Middle East. He was anxious
about the situation on the Indian frontier and in Burma and a
coming Mahomedan festival on the 19th October (Bakrld)
might show unwelcome developments. In Afghanistan the
Amir appeared to be adopting a correct attitude towards the
German mission, but he had to face internal intrigues directed
at forcing him to declare a Jahad ; and Lord Hardinge con
sidered it most important to avoid a rupture with the Persian
Government, as if Persia joined Turkey he did not see how
the Amir could hold out.
On the 8th October General Nixon replied to Sir Beauchamp
Duff’s personal wire of the 7th : “ Attitude of Turks being as
it is, their sending troops back towards us obliges me for military
reasons to be strong in front .... We are within fifty miles
of Baghdad and whether, in event of Turks in course of time
sending large forces against us, we get reinforcements or not,
our most favourable position to hold what we have won is
Baghdad rather than below it. But unless forced by the enemy’s
action to take steps I am not committing myself.”
The same day Mr. Chamberlain wired direct to General
Nixon, repeating the telegram to India: “ Very urgent.
With what addition to your present force are you confident that
you can both occupy and hold Baghdad. Reply direct and
repeat reply to Government of India.” At the same time,
Mr. Chamberlain wired privately to Lord Hardinge : “ Reference
my telegram of to-day to Nixon repeated to you. Cabinet are
so impressed with great political and military advantages
of occupation of Baghdad that we shall make every effort to
supply necessary force. We do not wish to attempt it with
insufficient forces. Are you satisfied that one division is
sufficient ? ”
The reasons which led to the despatch of these two telegrams
are clearly shown in Mr. Chamberlain’s private letter of the
8th October to Lord Hardinge. j The Cabinet were greatly
impressed by the review of the situation in Lord Hardinge’s
and General Nixon’s telegrams and they authorised the despatch *
* It is doubtful if this term was meant to include Sir Beauchamp Duff,
f This reached Lord Hardinge about 4th November.