"الحرب الروسية-التركية، ١٨٧٧. العمليات في أوروبا." [و‎‎١‎٧] (٦٦/٣٣)

33
The badness of the roads had apparently made it necessary to use the
railway for the conveyance of troops—Infantry (as well as for that of stores
ana war materials), more than had been originally intended.
Ihe disembarkation from the railway of troops destined for such points up
the Danube as Kalafat Flamunda, Turnu Margureli, Giurgevo, and Kalarasch,
appears to be taking place at Marazesti, whence the high road leads by Fock-
bam and Rimmik, and meets the railway again at Buzeo. Army head-quarters,
it was ® a id, would be successfully transferred from Sculiani to Buzeo, and from
-Kuzeo to Ployesti.
According to the lastest April intelligence, the general situation seems to
have been as follows:—
The Russians were advancing parallel to the Danube, up the river, in two
columns. *
, ', 0f , adva nce no details were to hand, except, that the advanced guard
1 if 1 y orm f d froops pushed forward from those being concentrated
about Galatz and Barbosi) had reached Braila, which point and Galatz, and the
Barbosi bridge between them, were held by the 11th Corps of Lieutenant-
General Prince Schahovskoi. Ismail and Kilia, on the Russian side of the
liuth, south of Bolgrad and north of the Kilia estuary of the Danube, were
occupied by the 36th Division, belonging to the 7th Army-Corps. These
operations and concentrations on the left were then said to be preparatory
to a passage of the Danube at Galatz, and an entrance into the Dobrudscha
as so ^ n a § the occupation of other points up the river had been effected.
• information from St. Petersburg, names Giurgevo as the
pomt at which the main body of the Russian Army will most probably cross
the Danube. r j
II.
MOBILIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.
Russia was stated to have organised and put on a war footing, during the
month of April, nine fresh army-corps, exclusive of the Guard Corps, which
latter includes three divisions of Infantry, two of Cavalry, “three brigades of
Artillery, and one of Chasseurs.”
It is stated that there is a great deficiency of officers in the active army
engaged in the operations, and that a similar deficiency exists in the 13th
and 14th Corps.
r hi.
RUSSIAN ARMY DETAILS.
Official information from Vienna, received in April and dated 7th March
gives the details and distribution of the Southern Army, which it is needless
to recapitulate, as it is the same as has already been given in the portions of
this chapter for preceding months. The numerical strength, however, is not
quite the same, and there are one or two remarks that conflict with former
repoits. For instance, it is said not to be decided whether the coast Army of
Observation will reinforce the active Army of Operation directly, or whether
this reinforcement will be done by a new mobilization of other corps. It was
calculated that there would be amply sufficient time for any needful measures
of reinforcement during the six weeks which the troops will require for their
march to the Danube.
The numerical strength is thus given:—
Army of Operation.—Four Corps, numbering 144,000 men, 32,800 horses
and 432 guns.
Army of Observation.—72,000 men, 16,400 horses, and 216 <nins.
Total Field Army.—210,000 men, 49,200 horses, 648 guns.
To supplement the above information, comes intelligence from St. Peters
burg, from a trustworthy source.
K
April 1877