مجموعة ١٧/ ١٧ "تقارير سنوية لوزارة الخارجية، ١٩٣٢-١٩٣٨، ١٩٤٧. استعراض سنوي للأحداث ١٩٣٩-١٩٤٢. استعراض سياسي ١٩٤٣-١٩٤٤" [ظ‎‎١‎٢‎٣] (٤٨٣/٢٤٦)

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50. At Rome Nuri Pasha found Baron Aloisi at first more concerned to
press him to sign a treaty of friendship which had been under negotiation or
some time between Iraq and Italy, than to solve the Iraqi-lranian irontiei
question. Nuri Pasha succeeded in avoiding this entanglement and brought the
conversations back to their real subject. No progress was, however, made. Baron
Aloisi and his assistants persistently favoured Iranian designs and did then
utmost to persuade Nuri Pasha to accept a provisional agreement for the inter
national control of the Shatt-el-Arab which would have evaded a decision on
Iraq’s claim to sovereignty over the whole waterway and given the Iranians all
they wanted. There was no doubt that the Iranians intended that this provisional
arrangement, once put into effect, should become permanent. Nuri Pasha
maintained that he had no authority to discuss any proposal of this kind, and
on the 7th February, having received instructions to return to Iraq on account
of the Cabinet crisis, he left Rome for Bagdad.
57. The dispute was again taken to Geneva in May. A member of the
Italian delegation, Signor Soragna, acting on behalf of the rapporteur, elaborated
new proposals for a settlement. These provided for (a) the reaffirmation of the
1914 boundary from the Turkish frontier to the sea, but modified as in (b ); {b) the
extension of the Mohammerah anchorage southwards to a point opposite Bawarda
below Abadan giving Iran half the river for about 20 miles instead of 6 ; {c) the
conclusion of a conservancy and navigation agreement; (d) the withdrawal of
Iranian police posts in Iraqi territory and the settlement of outstanding questions
concerning the division of the waters of streams crossing the boundary. These
proposals were, at the time, rejected by both delegations, but before the Council
session ended it was agreed that they should be the subject of direct discussions
later in the year.
58. An Iraqi delegation, headed again by Nuri Pasha, accordingly visited
Tehran early in August. A number of proposals were then examined, including
several drafts with which the Iranians tried to trick the Iraqis into giving them
effective sovereignty over half of the Shatt-el-Arab.
59. These methods did not succeed, and although the Iraqis continued to
elaborate the details of their offer that, in return for recognition by Iran of the
1914 frontier, they would endeavour to remove all the practical disabilities which
this frontier might create for Iranian interests, their efforts at conciliation
elicited no response from the Iranians. Nevertheless, when, at a final audience
of the Shah, Nuri Pasha spoke favourably of the rapporteur's proposal that Iraq
should cede to Iran an anchorage off Abadan, he found the Shah sympathetic
and apparently willing to accept the existing frontier subject to this one adjust
ment. There was then no time left to go into details, but it was decided to resume
negotiations at Geneva during the September session of the Council. On this
occasion, however, the Iranians showed far more interest in a tripartite pact
of non-aggression sponsored by Turkey than in the boundary dispute, which was
again adjourned for further direct negotiations in Bagdad.
60. The Iranian delegation, headed by M. Samii, Iranian Minister at
Bagdad, assembled at Bagdad on the 11 th December. The Iraqi delegates were
Nasrat-al-Farisi from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Yusuf Ghanima from
the Ministry of Finance, and Khalil Ismail from the Ministry of the Interior
Calls were exchanged and dinner parties given, but work was difficult as neither
side had been given precise instructions by their Governments. The Iraqi Govern
ment had, howeyei, decided that it would be best to begin by discussing the
proposed convention establishing equal co-operation between Iraq and Iran in
the control and regulation of navigation and conservancy in the Shatt-el-Arab
and it was believed that the Iranian delegation would agree to this procedure
A convention of this kind had long been recommended by His Majesty’s Govern
ment m the United Kingdom as the best way of removing the practical difficulties
created for Iran by the 1914 frontier and both Governments had been given the
araft of a suitable text. His Majesty’s Government had also made it known to
both sides that, in view of the fact that 90 per cent, of the ocean-going shipping
using the Shatt-el-Arab flew the British flag, Great Britain woufd expect to be
invited to be a signatory to any convention for the control of conservancy and
navigation which might be negotiated between the two countries. ^