ملف ٣٥١٦\١٩١٤ الجزء ٩ "الحرب الألمانية: بلاد فارس" [و‎‎٣‎١] (٦١٨/٦٦)

As lon 0 as irermaa caisuland asonts remain in pars I
do no-o think that any improvement can be expected in the
situation. Unleca the Persian Government are able and
prepared to have them removed it is better m my opinion
#or u;j “to v/itndrav/. t f got we ramnf ^ o.i
0 cdiL.ou i cd.y eiuner on Kawam
or Goulet to deal adequately with the situation. '
One advantage of withdrawal would be that it would
enable our authorities in the G ulf and elsewhere to
undertake such military and other measures as may be
considered advisable. I would suggest that the Persian
G ovemment should be informed that expulsion of British
from Shiras will entail the following measures on the
part oi his Mcijesty’s GoveriTiient:-
!• Military occupation of nr at is tan, Gulf ports
and. Geistan.
y^^PPas^^of all trade v/itn Southern Persia, doth
imp or o and export,, until situation in Persia is satis-
lac oo ry.
, withdrawal from Yezd and Kerman might be also nec-
essary*
Addressed to_Tehran, repeated to BushireM 1 (ends)* "
0 _ ^Of course, if we can no longer look to Kawam and
Gjaien to save the situation in Pars, I see nothing for
it ouu to direct the Consul and colony to leave but
though position t of Consul is beyond question very perilous
1 can ,iardly think, after his repeated expressions of
complete (?confidence omitted) in them, they arc in
capable of_taking effective action provided that wo are
ready finance them and *t^at they understand that we
iook_ to tilem to adminis ter the province almost indepen
dently ^oi the Central Government.
If Consul leaves we must expect to see both Kawam
ana Soule t fall into tho enemy camps and the effect of that
on Bearsclus (sic) and even on Bakhtiari would be dis
astrous. I am, of course, most reluctant to ask Consul
torramain a position of so much danger but it appears
to me that the interests at stake make it necessary to
•hold out as long as possible, if we can find the requisite
money, i think that Kawam should be able to provide suf-
licient force to protect the C onsulate.
i can see no advantages in evacuation unless the
, n U- J J ' • 1 _r> _
UV5U i UUfiU UI UUi.iUIi 0 01 A.UU blctli UX UUpb cl 0 fvclb V Hi •
Occupation of Gulf Ports would have little useful effect
ana indood would probably only result in adding fuel to
tne hostility which the Germans have roused against us.
Addressed to the Foreign office, sent to India,
nasran and Potrograd.