خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎١‎٢‎١] (٢٤٨/٢٤١)

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
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PERSIA.
July 8, 1942.
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Under Secretory or |
Copy No.
Mr. Holman to Mr. Eden—(Received July S.)
(No. 197.) 1 ^ -
Sir, Tehran, June 21, 1942. ^ t\ r Mi/'r.
IT might have been supposed that after the signature of the Anglo-Soviet-
Persian Treaty on the 29th January, 1942, the relations between Persia and her s/ ti
new Allies would improve in an orderly and peaceful manner. It is regrettable
that this has not been the case. Such has been the complete lack of power of
decision of the Persian Government and their ill-conceived resistance to the
relatively moderate demands which we have made upon them, that in April
steps had to be taken to move up British troops in the direction of Tehran in
conjunction with the Russians and to let it be inferred that force might have to
be employed a second time. In this despatch I have the honour to review and
analvse the causes of this state of affairs.
2. Without any doubt the two principal causes were :—
(1) British military and naval set-backs at the beginning of the year in
Africa and in the Far East, and
(2) The continued presence of the Japanese Legation in Tehran.
So long as our interests were suffering in the various theatres of war, it was
only natural that Axis propaganda and activities should take on a new lease
of life here and that Persians, who might otherwise be well disposed towards us,
should, assume that old profession of “ fence-sitting. I he flames of anti-British
feeling were at the same time fanned by the Japanese Legation, who with their
network of financed propaganda and intelligence activities played on the fears
and feelings of the public, who were led to believe that all their sufferings,,
particularly economic, were due to the Allies. The rupture of relations between
Persia and Japan accordingly became one of our primary objectives, on which
progress in every other sphere depended. The Anglo-Soviet-Persian 1 reaty
could naturally not be quoted in support of any representation to the Persian
Government, owing to the fact that Japan was still in diplomatic relations
with Russia. It was accordingly urged upon the Persian Government that the
closing of the Japanese Legation could reasonably be expected as an earnest of
goodwill as between Allies on account of Japan’s unprovoked aggression; that
it would not harm Persian interests in Japan or Japanese interests in Persia,
both of which were to all practical purposes non-existent; that the continued
presence of the Japanese Legation could serve no useful purpose, as all
communication facilities had been denied them, and that the Japanese Legation
was, in fact, nothing more than a centre from which military intelligence reports
were sent to the enemy. Indeed, the Japanese were suspected of using a secret
wireless transmitter, and their agents were known to be distributing large sums
of money and quantities of subversive literature.
3. I need not recount at length the history of the long and repeated
representations to the Persian Government begun early in February. Suffice it
to say that no progress could be achieved with this question for about two months.
It was necessary to use every possible form of inducement and pressure. The
United States Government were persuaded to make the grant of lease-lend
facilities for the Persian Government and the provision of expert advisers
dependent on the rupture of relations between Persia and Japan. The Soviet
Government agreed to inform the Persian Government that the\ had no objection
to their breaking off relations with Japan. His Majesty’s Legation collected
all evidence from secret and other sources to prove that the Japanese Legation
were indulging in undiplomatic and subversive activities and this information
was communicated to the Persian authorities. linally. the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, the Prime Minister and His Majesty the Shah himself were warned in
no uncertain terms that the situation would seriously deteriorate, unless early
satisfaction were received. -
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