خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎١‎١‎٦] (٢٤٨/٢٣١)

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOYERNMEN
PERSIA.
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CON FIEfENTI AL
E 5057/14/34]
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August 23, 1942.^^'^^
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Section 1. Wt>jvx4Aj f ^ / J/v
Copy No. J 2 2
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R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received Auqust 23.)
(No. 270.) V y 1
^ r ’ , Tehran, August 14, 1942.
/ /frc u ITH reference to my telegrams describing the day-to-day development of
the recent Cabinet crisis here, ending in my telegrams Nos. IPO S^nd 1004, I have
the honour to inform you that the fall of All Soheily ’s Cabinet on the 30th July
came as a surprise to many observers. I propose in this despatch to attempt to
analyse the reasons for Soheily’s resignation, as well as to describe shortly the
political events which followed it, culminating in Ahmad Qawam’s presentation
of his new Cabinet to the Shah and the Majlis on the 9th August.
2. The ex-Prime Minister, in his farewell statement to the Majlis, a
summary^) of which I enclose hereinv^attributed his resignation to the lack of
sympathy shown by the Majlis and the press to his Government’s efforts to deal
with current problems. There is no doubt that a number of Deputies, chief
among whom were Ali Dashti, Saham-us-Sultan Bayat and Dr. Malik-Zadeh,
were opposed to Soheily and did their best to make difficulties for him. Their
explanation of their conduct was that Soheily, in order to obtain their support,
had made a number of promises to them which he did not fulfil; for instance, he
had promised to award the post of Minister of the Interior to Farajullah
Bahramy (Dabir-A’zam), but had not kept his promise. Bayat was openly
working for the post of Prime Minister, and Dr. Malik-Zadeh was hoping for a
lucrative appointment in the university. Soheily was forced by the Majlis to
attend endless secret sessions in person, after which the same subjects were often
discussed in public without any regard for any decisions that may have been
taken in secret session. To many observers Soheily appeared to be afraid of the
Majlis. Nevertheless, the public, such as it is, seems to have recognised that the
Majlis were unreasonably obstructive, and there has been much criticism of
the Deputies.
3. As for the press, there were certainly a number of attacks on various
members of the Cabinet and on the Cabinet’s policy as a whole in certain Tehran
newspapers, and an attempt to control the press by a new law evoked so much
opposition that Soheily felt obliged to abandon the struggle. Certain Majlis
Deputies were of the opinion that, if he had been courageous enough to use the
powers which were already at the disposal of the Government in virtue of the state
of military law which still exists at Tehran, he could have checked this irrespon
sible criticism without recourse to new legislation. But, most important of all,
there was much criticism of the Government for failing to deal adequately with
the question of food distribution. Adequate powers had, admittedly after much
delay, been given to Government by the Majlis, but nothing effective had been
done to check hoarding, and the occasion, if not the cause, of the crisis ending
in the downfall of the Government was rioting in towns such as Malayir and
Burujird, where the new harvest is already available, and there was no excuse
for bread shortage. It is only fair to add that there are some grounds for
believing that the riots were not spontaneous. But it is an undoubted fact that
the Government were unwilling to deal with hoarders, and many people hinted
darkly that prominent officials, and even Ministers, were in the racket themselves.
The Government certainly did little, if anything, to suppress the widespread
corruption of the country, and there were a number of scandalous rumours about
financial and moral irregularities committed by the Prime Minister himself.
4. The unfortunate incident of M. Aliy’s appointment as ambassador to
the Soviet Union may also have helped to undermine Soheily’s self-confidence.
When Mohammad Saed Maragha’i was brought from Kuibyshev to take over
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, it appears that Aliy’s appointment to replace
him was decided by the Shah, Soheily and the Soviet Ambassador without any
formal notification to Ahy, the result being that the latter became annoyed,
hinted that he would not go, and finally resigned from the Cabinet three days
[33-10]
Not printed.
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