خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎١‎١‎٣] (٢٤٨/٢٢٥)

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
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Section 2.
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Sir R. Bullard to Mr
J
Eden.-
(No. 314.)
Sir,
-(Redeiced October 22.)
Copy No.
Vi
112
/. tl/dfetL,
O
Tehran, September 22,^1942.
I HAVE the honour to inform you that, notwithstanding the serious military /) /^tl
situation in Russia, a certain change for the better has occurred here since
II
wrote mv despatch No. 248 of the 28th July , mainly as a sequel of the replacement
of M. Ali Soheily by Qawam es Saltaneh as Prime Minister and the latter’s
somewhat unexpected display of energy. During the last days of the Soheily
Government things went from bad to worse. The Prime Minister seemed to have
lost all control of the situation, and it was widely rumoured that he was engaging
in various forms of corruption himself. There was no limit to the inefficiency of
the Administration, the vacillation of the Government, or the irresponsibility of
the Deputies. Indeed, Soheily had apparently lost ali confidence in himself and
was quite unable to take any decision. It was a real relief when he resigned on
the 30th July and was replaced by Qawam es Saltaneh. Details of the develop
ment of the Cabinet crisis have been described separately^ in my telegrams and in
my d espatc h No. 270.
2. The new Prime Minister, who belongs to the older generation of land-
owners, is showing himself to be a vigorous, determined and sometimes obstinate
old gentleman, but after an initial period in which, as will be described below, the
utmost difficulties have been experienced in securing even our essential desiderata,
he now seems to be settling down well. On receiving your telegram No. 10 7-Q-of..
the 29th July, I informed the Shah that His Majesty s Government would accept
any Government which the Persians might set up, provided that it would
co-operate energetically with the Allies, and it is now justifiable to hope that the
present Government will, for the time being at any rate, fulfil this requirement.
Soon after taking office the Prime Minister made it clear to me that he did not
intend to stand any nonsense from the Majlis, and he has also told the Soviet
Ambassador that he proposed to remind them as often as might be necessary that
their authority did not rest on popular approval. Qawam has been as good as his
word, and his firmness has greatly increased his reputation, both among the public
and among the Deputies themselves.
3. Generally speaking, we need a Prime Minister here in present circum
stances who is either a respectable and influential person who is prepared and
able to secure acceptance of our essential war requirements by his countrymen or,
in the last resort, one who is open toother inducements. In view of the present
unwillingness of various suitable personalities to take office (e.g., M. Pirnia),
Qawam es Saltaneh seems to be almost the only candidate of the first category. I
am, however, anxious to have some alternative ready, and the oriental secretary
is accordingly going to Palestine very shortly in order to see Said Zia ed din
Tabatabai.
Security Questions.
4.
energy.
l-Kti.
Meanwhile, the Prime Minister has carried out his duties with some
One of the most difficult questions outstanding when Soheily resigned
was undoubtedly our request for the handing over of eighteen Persians known co
be engaged in Axis activities. Whilst Soheily delivered to us a few Germans and
Persians already under detention, no action was taken by him in regard to the
list of eighteen before he fell from office. In the early days of the Government a
new list of over forty persons, who were believed by us to be definitely incrimi
nated, was submitted to the Persian Government with a request for their arrest
and delivery to the British military authorities. I explained in paragraphs 5-6
of mv despatch No 248 why it was considered essential for suspects to be guarded
^ and interrogated by ourselves, although we well realised how difficult it was for
the Persians to hand over their own nationals to the authorities of a foreign
Power in their own country. Although Qawam proceeded to arrest the persons
concerned, he obstinately refused to hand over the Persians, and it became clear
p 7 / b
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