خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎١‎٠‎٢] (٢٤٨/٢٠٣)

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(No.
Sir,
80.)
Sir R. Bullard to
Mr. Eden .—
/ T ot
943
ceivea March
Copy No. 114
•)
Tehran, February 25, 1943.
THE vote of confidence in the new Prime Minister, M. Soheily, and his
Cabinet on the 21st February affords a convenient opportunity for reviewing the
main outlines of the recent Cabinet crisis which has formed the subject of a
series of recent telegrams ending with my teleg ram No. 198 of the 21st February
last. I summarise below the principal political events which have happened since
Qawam es Sultaneh’s position began to become difficult, in the middle of January
last.
2. Since the disorders of the 8th December, 1942, it became increasingly
evident that relations between the Shah and Qawam es Sultaneh were going
from bad to worse. The Shah appeared determined to direct and control the
army, and to interpret literally the constitutional principle that he was the
Commander-in-Chief of his forces. The Prime Minister, on the other hand,
was determined to assert and establish the principle of ministerial responsibility
for all Ministries, especially the Ministry of War, and he had not long previously
announced his intention to ask for full powers from the Majlis, enabling him to
assume personal responsibility for the current business of the country. That
proposal, however, provoked strong opposition not only from thc-Majlis but from
the Court and it was not followed up. It was clear that such political manoeuvring
for power caused great inefficiency and a general slowing down of the administra
tive machine. Throughout this time my Soviet and American colleagues and I
supported the Prime Minister, and I endeavoured to effect a reconciliation between
Qawam es Sultaneh and the Court.
3. I had reason to hope on the 19th January that a reconciliation had indeed
taken place and that the Prime Minister would introduce new blood into his
Cabinet at the instigation of the Shah. Two days later he introduced to the
Majlis the following new Ministers : Jawad Ameri at the Ministry of Justice
(instead of the Interior); Farajullah Bahramy at the Ministry of the Interior;
Muhsin Rais at the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs; Ali Mutamedi at the
Ministry of Communications; and Nasrullah Intizam at the Ministry of Health.
He also announced that Allahyar Saleh would become Minister of Finance on
his return to Persia from the E T nited States. At the same time the Prime Minister
tabled a Bill establishing a Ministry of Labour and National Economy, to which
Dr. Musharraf Naficy was to be appointed. The Majlis did not receive this
announcement with enthusiasm and Qawam was well advised not to put the new
Cabinet to the vote. The Majlis Deputies showed surprising opposition to
Dr. Naficy and the new Ministry of Labour and National Economy never came
into existence. Of the new Ministers three (Rais, Mutamedi and Intizam) were
regarded as the Shah’s men, and were in consequence looked on with some
suspicion by many of the Majlis Deputies. The remaining members of the Cabinet
continued in their posts.
4. There followed an uneasy period of a few days during which the new
Ministers (with the exception of Dr. Naficy) began to take over their duties, while
the Majlis Deputies showed their usual obstructiveness—some being suspicious
of the new men, others disappointed that none of the Deputies had been appointed
to ministerial rank. The Prime Minister thereupon introduced a Bill designed
to abrogate the law of the 22nd Tir, 1306, that no Deputy could be appointed a
Minister without resigning and waiting for three months, but that attempt to
buy over the Majlis merely succeeded in raising acute jealousy between rival
Deputies who longed for ministerial rank, and the Bill was soon referred to a
commission and shelved. The well-known politician Tadayyun expressed the
opinion that the country was heading for chaos, and needed a strong hand to
[40-38]