خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎٩‎٨] (٢٤٨/١٩٥)

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it has been hampered by the lon^ disuse of the powers of self-government and
by the steep rise in prices and other hardships which have accompanied, if they
have not resulted from, the foreign occupation. Whatever the cause of the present
conditions, however, it would be foolish to suppose that the prospects for the
continued existence of a parliamentary regime in Persia are bright. The form
of government adopted by Reza Shah was probably well-suited to Persia—a
^Cabinet and a Parliament as a constitutional facade, but a strong hand in the
background directing both; only he nullified the good he did by stupidity and
greed. At present there is no benevolent and capable dictator in sight, and even
if there were and the people were prepared to accept him, it is probable that his
advent to power would be discouraged by the Soviet Government—at least during
the occupation. Much depends on the degree of success with which the American
|financial adviser wields the special powers which the Majlis, after dangerous
| delay, seem likely to confer on him. If that fails there may be such confusion
i^xj^nd poverty in Persia that the temptation to take the easy road and to fall in
^Hiivith Soviet ways will be great. The Persian loves his independence, but an
independence which seemed to offer nothing but a broadening down from
embezzlement to embezzlement might in the long run cease to be attractive. For
our part, we must try to discover rulers less venal and conservative than most of
those who at present attain to high office, and to induce them to adopt a policy
of reform suitable to the human material to which it is to be applied. Our main
obstacle will be that Soviet sympathisers can offer a more glittering prize and
play upon the baser Persian qualities. Meanwhile, the Russians are acquiring,
in comparison with ourselves, a popularity which, albeit undeserved, must be
taken into account as a very serious factor—'the more serious in that the circum
stances which have created this popularity at our expense will make it difficult
to redress the balance. It is tragic to learn from General Hurley, the personal
representative of President Roosevelt in the Middle East, that among those who
^ are busy to praise the Russians and to criticise the British are senior members of
| the American forces in Persia.
19. This despatch has dealt with the disease. The malady is deep-seated,
because it resides in the nature of the Persian on one side and of the Soviet people
and regime on the other; and it is aggravated by the looming proximity of
Russia to this country. It must not be assumed, however, that there is no possible
remedy, or at least no means of alleviation. There is Persian inertia, which will
begin to exercise its full passive force when once the Soviet troops have left the
country. This will affect more or less even Persians born in Russia and now
“refugees ” in Persia, whom the Russians might wish to use as leaders of the
revolution. Fear of Russia is very strong in the Persian, but when the Soviet
troops have gone there will at least be talk, if not critical articles, about Soviet
commercial methods during the war, the iniquitous munitions factories agreement,
and the humbug of the Soviet offer of wheat. If Persian independence is’
seriously menaced, the Persians will turn in the first place to Great Britain for
sympathy and assistance, though, as I have said, the remedy would have to be
sought not in a local tussle but within the wider framework of world security.
In the south of Persia, where the British have been known for generations, we
still enjoy much respect and goodwill, and although a tendency has been found
as far south as Shiraz to blame us for the present miseries on the ground that
are all-powerful and could prevent them if we wished, this feeling may
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diminish if the crisis abates, and it already has as a counter-weight the general
recognition of the relief work which is being done in the south, mainly through
His Majesty’s consular officers, in the name of the Anglo-Persian Relief Society.
The various forms of annoyance which the British are accused of afflicting on the
Persians—the oil shortage, the lack of transport, the high prices—will cease or
be mitigated, and if they are not forgotten they may perhaps come to be regarded
as attributable to the Russians as much as to us. The best kind of British
propaganda will survive the war—that of the British Council. There is an
immense demand for a knowledge of English as the coming world language and
as the key to a literature which the Persian is able to appreciate, and this should ;
enable us to reach the younger generation, where, if anywhere/tn Persia, ^ome
sparks of character and honesty will be found. K ) £ '3 £-
I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.
1 1943
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