خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎٩‎٦] (٢٤٨/١٩٢)

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Russia, and to alleviate the hardships of war out of humanity and out of loyalty
to the obligations incurred under the Tripartite Treaty. We have earned the
hostility of landlords and of many Persian officials by trying to assist the Persian
Government to collect the wheat surplus : the Russians have done nothing of the
kind in their area and have thus avoided friction with officials and landowners,
while making a merit of not interfering in the internal affairs of Persia. The
British and American members of the Road Transport Board have laboured
incessantly to rationalise and assist the civilian road transport of Persia, but the
Russian member never attends, so that the Russians get the benefit of the labours
of the board without sharing in the criticism which is directed against it by the
ignoiant and the corrupt. It is natural that the relief work done by.the Anglo-
Persian Relief Society, whose funds are provided largely by His Majesty’s
Government, and the provision by the British military authorities of a 1,000-bed
hospital foi‘ civilian typnus cases, should have compelled the Red Army to offer
vaccination, ambulances and disinfecting squads to combat epidemics among the
civilian population. It is no less natural that the Soviet Government, in view of
the propaganda which we have been obliged tp do, to convince the Persian public
that the British and Americans were doing their best to implement the under
taking to supply Persia with 25,000 tons of wheat, should wish to make some
contribution to the Persian food problem; but to spring this offer on us without
notice is an act bordering on bad faith.
15. I he Americans are perhaps no less an object of suspicion than the
British to the Soviet Government and their representatives in Persia. The
Soviet Government have so far refused to give their formal assent to the replace
ment of the British operational staff on the Persian railways by Americans,
though the change is obviously to the benefit of the Russians, since the Americans
can provide a far larger staff and thus intensify the rate of the despatch of aid to
Russia. 'There is, however, theoretical justification for, the Russians’ refusal,
in that the proposed change does not seem to have been notified to the Soviet
Goveinment au the time either by the British or the United States Government;
but the hostility to the x\merican advisers which the Soviet authorities arc
undoubtedly showing is more difficult to justify. The Russians have even forced
out of Tabriz an American who had been sent there by the Ministry of Supply
to try to collect wheat, not only to feed Tabriz and Tehran, but also to fulfil the
Persian Government’s contract to supply 5,000 tons of wheat to the Soviet
authorities, and they refuse to allow him to go back. From the British point of
view the Americans are, perhaps, the sole hope of Persia, British and Russian
advisers are ruled out for political reasons; advisers from the smaller countries
ot hurope would not have the prestige to enforce attention to their advice. It is
oui that the Americans may be able to collect around them a nucleus of
to erably good Persian officials and to ensure that all officials should receive
salaries above the level where bribery and embezzlement are almost inevitable
1 he Soviet opposition, which is none the less strong because it is usually denied
m public, is based on the argument which is in striking contrast to the cynical
comments which are made on the Persian Government and administration in
private by the Soviet Ambassador and other Soviet officials, that the Persians
are quite capable of managing their own affairs. Some critics also argue that
it is a mistake for the Persians to hand over their affairs to foreigners after
being free for twenty years, and there is evidence, which I accept as good that
they have even suggested that the Soviet Union is the place where the belt officials
are to be found. .It seems probable that the prospect which we regard with hope
if not with optimism, the Russians regard with ill will, viz., that the American
advisers may succeed in establishing an administration which will gradually
make Persia more prosperous and contented and better able to maintain its
independence.
16. There is no doubt that whereas at the time of the occupation the
Russians were regarded as barbarians capable of any atrocity and we were looked
upon wuth comparative favour, the position is now reversed in the popular mind
and if the richer classes have not changed their opinion, they dare not sav so
openly. In only one respect, perhaps, is the new Soviet reputation in Persia
deserved : the behaviour of their troops. They work their men nearly all the
time let them out little give them no money to get drunk on, and shoot them for
small offences, it has also been stated bv a Soviet officer, in conversation with a
British consular official, that the Soviet authorities provide the men with
regimental piostitutes disguised vaguely as A.I.S. Among our own troops there
is bound to be some drunkenness, especially when vodka is easier to get than
beer, and there have been violent articles in the press on this subject which cannot
be dismissed as baseless. It is unfortunate that the British soldier who possesses