خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎٩‎٦] (٢٤٨/١٩١)

Minister to give this offer immediate publicity, confident that the Prime Minister
would not dare to make public at the same time that the Soviet Government still
required the execution of the contract for the supply of wheat and barley to the
Soviet troops in Azerbaijan. Attacks on Great Britain have been frequent
recently, but if Russia is ever mentioned it is with praise. Persian statesmen
take this for granted and seem to consider it excusable and natural. The Prime
Minister tells me that he recently asked one of the leading journalists in Tehran
why he attacked the British and never the Russians, and that the man replied. \
with surprise at being asked such a question : But the Russians are kidnapping j
Persians . . . .” I he Poles are frequently attacked for bringing in typhus, j
and we for bringing in the Poles. Setting aside the fact that typhus is endemic
in this country, it is typical that no Persian ever points out that it was in Russia
that the Poles contracted typhus, and that their presence in Russia was no fault
of theirs.
13. It is a matter for surprise that the Soviet Government accepted as
meekly as any other Government the despotic regime of Reza Shah in Persia, with
its complete ban on their propaganda activities. The Counsellor to the Soviet
Embassy is credibly reported to have said recently that Soviet Russia is going
to take a greater interest in Persia after the war. Two characteristics of the
Russian attitude at present towards Persian affairs in general are their support
of the I udeh party and their demand for constitutionalism with its emphasis on
their own non-intervention. I he Russians do in fact intervene to the extentof giving
discreet support to the Tudeh party, whose founder. Sulaiman Mirza. ranks as a
communist, and of distributing newsprint to its newspaper and to other papers also.
1 he protection of the Tudeh party has in one case run contrary to the principle of
non-intervention : the Persian Government wish to bring to Tehran for trial three
men whom they allege to be criminals, but who also happen to have taken part in
labour tioubles at a factory at Shahi, in the Soviet zone, and the Soviet authori
ties refuse to permit this. The Tudeh party is not very revolutionary in its
pul),ished statements, and it is often alleged that the Soviet authorities support
it as a blind to cover more serious activities conducted underground. The Soviet
authorities might, however, well consider the strict application of constitutional
government in Persia, with its guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press,
as the best way of producing anarchy, as the preliminary to the setting up of a
Soviet form of organisation. In advocating strict adhesion to the constitution,
the Soviet Embassy must really have their tongue hard in the cheek': complete
freedom is all very well for countries other than Soviet Russia, until such men
appear as can get into power by means of this freedom and then create the
necessary dictatorship. There is no reason for us to think, from our contact with
Russians here, that they have any illusions about Persian statesmen or officials
or journalists, or suppose that a democratic regime can work in this country,
and if they support democracy for Persia it is reasonable to think that the aim
is not altogether disinterested. Nevertheless, if, as is probable, they are working
hard in order to place in the next Majlis a considerable number of men professing
extremist opinions, they are assisted, if not fully justified, bv the crass selfishness
of the small possessing and ruling class in Persia and the vital need for an
improvement in the conditions of the poorer classes.
14. If the Soviet authorities in Persia are trying to curry favour with the
Persians, to make use of the press and to influence the elections,'it is possible that
this is in part defensive and a result of suspicion of British intentions. Some
ground of suspicion has been given from time to time by light-hearted attempts
by British officers and groups to enter, or to obtain permission to enter, the Soviet
zone, in order to carry out reconnaissances whose purpose was undefined and
whose utility to the Soviet Government was not evident to the Soviet authorities
on the spot. His Majesty’s Legation have recommended from the beginning the
use of frankness with the Soviet authorities and the avoidance of anv action
which might suggest that we were unduly inquisitive about their zone, or that we
wished to acquue a favoured position in this country. It is sometimes sim^ested
by people who see at close quarters the misery which has resulted from the
weakening of control since the abdication of Reza Shah, that we ought to have
taken over the administration. I hese critics have perhaps not reflected that the
adoption of this policy, apart from the absorption of a huge body of skilled British
officials and the destruction of any hope of getting co-operation from the -Persian
authorities, would either have been opposed strenuously by the Soviet Government
or would have been imitated in the Soviet zone with consequences which could
Hardly be favourable to our long-term policy in this country. The Soviet authori-
ttes may have found cause tor suspicion in the efforts wc have made to assist the
Persians, in order to keep the administration running for the sake of aid to
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