خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎٩‎٤] (٢٤٨/١٨٧)

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOVERNMENT
PERSIA.
SECRET.
[E 2939/82/34]
SECRET
May 21, 1943.
With the Compliments
of the
Under Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs
Section 2.
Copy No* 1X9
Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.
-(Received 21*/ May.)
(No. 170.)
&ir, Tehran', 3rd May, 1943.
IN my teleg ram No. 232 d ated the 1 st March, I suggested’* that we had
perhaps shown excessive loyalty to the principle of aporipium aid to
Russia, in that we had brought upon ourselves not only positive criticism from
the Persians but also comparisons with tne Russians highly unfavourable to our
selves. All this, however, was our own doing. In the pre^ntfdespatch I propose
to examine the attitude and acts of the Soviet authorises ill Pir&ia,-. and to
see whether any deduction can be drawn from them as to the long-term policy
of Soviet Russia in regard to this country and to its effect on Persia.
2 . Soon after the occupation of August 1941 the Soviet Government asked
the Persian Government to agree to the opening of a large number of Soviet
consular posts in various parts of the country. In the earlier years after the
last war there were some fifteen such posts, including the southern towns of
Isfahan, Kerman and Shiraz. All except one were, I believe, closed in about
1938, when the Soviet Government closed down nearly all the foreign consulates
in the Soviet Union; and at the time of the occupation there was only one
Persian Consulate in Russia (Baku),' and only one Soviet Consulate in Persia
(Pahlevi). The Persian Government tried to resist the demand for the reopening
of so many consulates, basing its attitude on the principle of reciprocity, but
secured nothing but the shadowy hope of an extension of Persian consular
representation in the Soviet Union after the war; and eventually they had to
acquiesce in the appointment of such consular officials as the Soviet Embassy
liked to notify to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. There is, however, littfe
evidence to show that these consular officers abuse their functions overtly. If
the Soviet consular representatives in Tabriz and Meshed and other places
in the Russian zone exercise considerable influence over the local authorities
that is balanced by the influence of His Majesty’s consular officers elsewhere.
The Soviet Consulate in Isfahan seems to cultivate the poorer classes of the
population, but we, ourselves, are interested in the hitherto badly-treated
factory population of that town. Soviet Consuls in Kermanshah and Ahwaz
have perhaps shown more interest in the tribes than is necessary for their work,
and the staff of the former have toured a good deal among the Kurds and are
reported to have given assurances of friendship—certainly to have gone farther
than His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz has gone in his strictly correct
dealings with the Kurds in his district. Moreover, the Soviet Consul at
Kermanshah, on one occasion, allowed his training in propaganda for orien|«4
peoples to get the better of his discretion : he is reported to have tried so; le
highly characteristic anti-imperialist propaganda on an Indian Moslem offic
and, although he denied this, the origin and character of the Indian officer ccjnP
cerned, and the fact that he is a Moslem, whereas the Soviet Consul represent itfc
him as hoping for a Japanese victory, make it certain in my opinion that t iH
officer’s report was correct. >~
3. It will be remembered that on their entry into northern Persia t igj
Soviet authorities disarmed the Persian police and gendarmerie, and refused t<*£}
allow any Persian troops to be stationed in their zone. The unarmed polii'^
and gendarmerie were unable to keep order, but whenever an appeal was ma le
to the Soviet authorities to assist it was rejected on the ground that the Soviet
authorities had undertaken not to interfere in the internal affairs of Pers a^j
Gradually and grudgingly the Persian Government were allowed to rearm
number of police and gendarmerie, though the Persian Government alwa r
maintained that the number allowed was insufficient. Eventually, the Sovi;
authorities permitted a small body of Persian troops to be stationed iP 1
Azerbaijan, though with little liberty of movement until perhaps quite recent y
It is difficult to believe that this policy was due to fear; the Russians are t&T
well acquainted with Persian poltroonery for that. It is significant that the
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