خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎٩‎٢] (٢٤٨/١٨٣)

3
Government’s weakness of policy that was not done. Nevertheless, Persia had
contributed a great deal towards the Allied cause, mainly through aid to Russia,
the effect of which in the South Russian campaign might even turn out to have
been decisive. Persia had also suffered a great deal, and she had not, in fact,
received full credit for what she had done. Persia could, of course, now join
the United Nations and definitely come into the war, but this would only be a
gesture, and would do nothing to make the country strong against the day when
"*xthe Peace Conference opened. Mr. Churchill had told him, when he visited
Tehran, that he wanted to deal with a Persia which was a strong and independent
Power. He believed Mr. Churchill’s words, and attached great importance to
them. He would like to see Anglo-Persian relations placed at once on a firm basis
with an eye to the future. He asked whether British policy in Persia was
conducted from London or Delhi. I replied that, of course, our policy emanated
from London, and he said that in that case there was some hope. It was a well-
known political principle, he continued, that a foreign Power would always wish
to profit from the internal weakness of a neighbouring State. He did not know
whether there were elements seeking to promote dissensions in Persia, but he did
beg that we should consider the means of adjusting our relations w r ith Persia at
once so as to strengthen her for the future. It was a question of national morale,
not only of finance and economics. When I questioned him as to how this could
be done, he said that he did not know what the external policy of his Majesty's
Government (he obviously had in mind Russia) might be. He had little concrete
to suggest, but was obviously feeling after some form of closer association with
Britain which would act as a block against Russian Communist penetmtion.
One thing, which he thought would help, would be the raising of the status of the
legation to that of an embassy. He had spoken to the Duke of Gloucester about
this, but he had since been told that nothing could be done until after the war.
The present situation, he said, was entirely illogical; the Russians had had an
embassy for many years. Even the Yugoslavs in London now had an Ambassador,
and the Americans had accepted a Persian Ambassador in Washington. This is
evidently a point on which he feels strongly, and I think that we should seriously
consider the possibility of meeting him over this.
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(5) Internal Affairs.
The Shah said that the hope of the country lay in the hands of the young—
in ideas and not necessarily only m age. He referred to a movement and what he
described as “ le type des jeunes ” which he said was growing, and encouragement
must be given to them, but even they were now being described as instruments of
British policy because Mr. Harold Nicholson in a broadcast from London had
referred to the need for “ young men rallying around their young King.” I asked
His Majesty whether he was aware of the creation of an Anglo-Persian Institute
here, and told himjhat when classes were opened for instruction in English
language there had been 2.000 applications. It had, of course, been quite impos
sible to deal with such a number owing to the lack of teachers, but I thought that it
was a significant and encouraging development for the future. His Majesty had
not heard of the institute, and expressed the greatest interest. The Shah
concluded by referring again to the need for strengthening Anglo-Persian
relations at once.
R G. CASEY.
Tehran. \§th April, 1943.
F