خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎٦‎٨] (٢٤٨/١٣٦)

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and olBcers under royal instructions, and other candidates, such as Sheikh Ali
Dashti, are evidently being backed by His Majesty. Seyyid Zia has had a
two hours’ interview with the Shah at which there was some plain speaking.
It appears possible that Seyyid Zia will be one of the candidates for* the
presidency of the Majlis, but his insistence on retaining his old-fashioned,
un-European sheepskin hat, and his unyielding attitude on other points, have
alienated some of his erstwhile supporters; he seems to have very definite ideas^-,
but the definiteness seems to merge into an obstinacy which some find irritating*
Tribal Situation.
16. There is little change since my last despatch. In Ears the Germans
are still at large; the Qashgai remain in possession of the arms taken from the
Persian forces; and the Government has done little or nothing to increase its
own prestige or to persuade any of the tribes that any advantage is to be gained
by loyalty to the Government. There is little reason to hope that by the time
of the spring migration the Government will have established any authority
over the Qashgai tribes or that its forces will be able to suppress the lawlessness
that is liable to accompany the migration and to continue through the summer
if unchecked. The only alternative open to the Government may be to give
more open recognition to Nasir and Khosrow Qashgai as the leaders of the tribe
and to charge them with the responsibility for maintaining order—a responsibility
which they would be willing to accept on their own terms. The result would
inevitably be to increase greatly the difficulty of the task of disarming the tribes
which the Government must eventually undertake if peace is ever to rest on a
stable basis. The situation is causing some concern to the Shah and some
members of the Government, and this may result in some restriction on General
Jahanbani’s easy-going policy of appeasement. But the Government is far from
being in a position to dictate terms to the Qashgai and Boir Ahmadi leaders.
17. The operations that were to have been undertaken against the Taiyyibi
and Bahmai tribes of Kuh-i-Galu have been virtually cancelled. General Amir
Ahmedi, before he was dropped from the Cabinet, discovered circumstances
that necessitated a modification of his original plans, and it is now unlikely
that even the modified plans will be put into effect, although some show of force
may be made to induce the tribal leaders to surrender sufficient arms to save
the Government’s face.
Security.
18. The tussle regarding the handing over to the Russians of the suspects
detained at Sultanabad, who are on the Russian list, continued during the period
under review. As foreshadowed in my despatch under reference, the Soviet
Charge d’Affaires wrote to me agreeing with my proposal that these suspects
should be released unless the Soviet authorities either took part in their inter
rogation or took them over for such action as they might think fit, but he
asked that their release should be once again postponed. He added, orally,
that the reason why the Soviet authorities could not take over their suspects
was the slackness of the Persian Governor at Resht, who was supposed to be
preparing accommodation for the suspects. In my reply I said that I agreed
to a postponement until the 2nd December, but that it was contrary to the terms
of the British agreement with the Persian Government regarding the arrest of
these suspects that we should detain any against whom we had no evidence, so
we could not wait indefinitely. * The Tehran Conference caused a further delay,
but the Soviet Embassy expressed willingness to take over their suspects on or
after the 8 th December.
19. Early in December the British security officials decided that the
evidence against some of the suspects on our list was not serious and I therefore
suggested that any who would probably qualify for release shortly should be
released at once, both as means of calming the rest and because I was not sure
that the Soviet security authorities might not make a magnificent gesture—
perhaps to signalise the conclusion of the Tehran Conference—and release some
or all of the suspects on their list to avoid revealing the fact that the Russian
evidence was of the most flimsy character. In their telegram No. 1178 of the
23rd December, the Foreign Office approved—subject to the views of the head
of Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq—the proposal that those Persians should
be released whose detention was not considered essential for security reasons.
20 . The position at the end of December was still unsatisfactory. The
suspects on the Russian list had not left Sultanabad, their transfer to Resht