خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎٦‎٦] (٢٤٨/١٣٢)

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that Tehran was expecting that some communique relating to Persia would
appear as a result of the conference. The communique, he suggested, should
( 1 ) recognise that Persia had done her best to help the Allies; ( 2 ) confirm the
assurances in the Tripartite Treaty of January 1942 as to the integrity and
independence of Persia; and (3) say something about economic assistance. A
similar appeal was made by the Shah when Mr. Churchill called on him. The
Persians already knew that the British and the Americans were both sympatheti(>^s
and that all they had to do was to secure the assent of the Russians. In tht
cordial atmosphere of the conference this assent was obtained, and a declaration
embodying the three points was eventually issued. This declaration gave the
i greatest satisfaction to the Shah, the Persian Government and the Persian people,
who seemed to attach almost as much importance to the recognition of their
services (mainly afforded grudgingly under pressure) and their sufferings (largely
the result of Persian incompetence and venality) as to the renewed guarantee by
the British and Russians of Persian territorial integrity and political indepen
dence and its endorsement by the Americans, though there was certainly a feeling
of relief that the Allies, who had been half expected to “ carve up ” Persia, should
have, on the contrary, given the most specific assurances to the contrary.
4. It was agreed that the declaration about Persia should be published at
the same time as the main declaration drawn up at the conference, viz., 2000 hours
Moscow time (2030 hours Tehran time) on the 6 th December, and every copy
held by the Allies, whether in English or in Russian, was headed by a warning
in that sense. In the event, a Persian translation of the declaration appeared
early on the morning of the 5th December in the Persian newspaper, Friend of
Persia, which is published by the Soviet Embassy. The embassy, who failed to
inform either the British or the United States Legation beforehand, declared
that publication was forced upon them by the news that the Persian Government
were about to issue the declaration. This is untrue. On the 4th December the
Soviet Charge d’Affaires informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he
intended to publish the declaration next day, promised at least to delay the
appearance of the Soviet newspaper until midday to give the Government time
to announce the declaration at a meeting of Ministers, Deputies and officials at
1030, and then had the newspaper in the hands of the public by 0900 o’clock.
This piece of sharp practice was presumably intended to counteract the general
impression that the Russians, and the Russians alone, had been opposed to the
issue of the declaration.
5. The Shah had wished to entertain the three delegations as guests of the
State and had offered three palaces for the purpose, and he was rather ruffled
that the demands of security made it impossible for the offer to be accepted. The
success of the conference from the Persian point of view dissipated this feeling,
but he felt some resentment that he was only able to see President Roosevelt by
calling on him in the Soviet Embassy, and he was therefore the more flattered
when Stalin paid him a visit at his palace and talked to him for over an hour.
Fortunately, Mr. Churchill’s long talk with the Shah as long ago as September
1942 and Mr. Eden’s talk with him in October 1943 gave us a long priority, but,
on the other hand, the Shah found a particular pleasure in his interview with
Marshal Stalin, partly because if the Russian bear purrs instead of growling the
Persian is always ravished with relief, and partly because of the sympathy
which the Shah thought he found in Marshal Stalin for his personal ambitions.
According to reliable reports from persons to whom the Shah spoke about the
interview, the Shah claims that Stalin advised him to keep a strong hold over
his people and to maintain a strong army to defend his country’s independence,
and offered to give him twenty tanks and twenty aeroplanes and to lend him
officers to teach the Persians how to use them. The Shah seems to have taken all
this at its face value. A more sceptical listener would have said to himself that,
if the Russians had tanks and aircraft to spare, they might reduce by that
number their demands on Great Britain and the United States; that for tlie only
kind of warfare that the Persian army has to face, viz., the suppression of tribal
disorder, there is no need for tanks, of which, indeed, Persia already possesses
100 ; that the despatch by the Russians of a military mission with the promised
tanks and aircraft would cut across the scheme for the reorganisation of the
army by American advisers and also to some extent the practice by which Persia
has looked to Great Britain (and not in vain) for aircraft and for assistance in
the training of pilots; and, finally, that there is something phoney, i.e., “ funny
peculiar,” about advice in favour of strong personal rule and a large army from
a ruler whose local embassy is openly backing the Tudeh party, whose members are
violently opposed to both.