خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎٥‎٢] (٢٤٨/١٠٣)

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that he was himself going to make a bid for popularity among the tribes, but
he seems to have reverted to his father’s idea that they must be disarmed as soon
and as ruthlessly as possible and kept in a state of weakness lest they become a
dangerous instrument in the hands of foreigners or schemers against the throne.
46. The Government, perhaps as the result of nearly three years’ persuasion
by this embassy, has also condescended to recognise that among the people of
Persia for whose welfare they are responsible are tribal communities—outlandish
'barbarians in the opinion of most of the Ministers—whose conditions of life
require special consideration. A tribal commission has been formed, composed
of the two Ministers without portfolio and two tribal Deputies, one a Bakhtiari
and one a Kurd. This commission has recommended the formation in the
Ministry of Interior of a tribal department which would be represented in the
provinces by committees for tribal affairs under the supervision of Governors-
General and Governors. Plans for the formation of this department with its
subsidiary committees are now being drawn up in conferences between representa
tives of the Ministries of the Interior and War. The Chief of the Staff has
advocated the assembly in Tehran of a commission to be composed of
representatives of the Ministries that would be concerned with projects for the
improvement of conditions in tribal areas—Agriculture, Public Health,
Education—and delegates from the principal tribes, to make recommendations
to the Government regarding the policy to be followed in tribal territory. The
decisions of the Government, he proposes, should be implemented in the provinces
by similar commissions assembled from time to time as required. The proposal
that the tribes should be allowed to speak for themselves may be too revolutionary
for a democratic Persian Government, but the attitude of the Chief of the Staff,
if sincere, gives reason for faint hope that the Persian army may, if it should
ever become bold enough to fight the tribes again, act with greater moderation
than it did in Reza Shah’s day.
47. It is unlikely that the tribes have interpreted the light that has shined
on them in Tehran as the dawning of a new day in their relations with the Central
Government. Only actions over a considerable period will convince them that
conciliatory actions by Government officials are more than a trick to keep them
quiet while the Government is weak. For the time being they are, with a few
exceptions, being unusually orderly.
48. With the surrender by the Qashgai of the Germans in March and of
Naubakht in May it became politic for British officials to show a less sceptical
face to the protestations of friendship of Nasir Qashgai and his brothers. Nasir
made more appropriate advances than he has yet done by visiting Shiraz and
calling on the acting Governor-General and His Majesty’s Consul, to whom he
gave fervent assurances of his desire to act in accordance with British wishes.
It suits him for the present to demonstrate his power for good in Ears by using
his influence to restrain the lawless inclinations of the Qashgai tribes; and their
behaviour during the spring migration and subsequently has been unusually
good. But Nasir’s change of heart did not extend so far as to induce him to pav
homage to his Sovereign during the latter’s visit to Shiraz in May. On hearing
that it was impending, Nasir retired to his mountains. He had offered to call on
the Shah if His Majesty’s Embassy would give him a safe-conduct, but this, for
obvious reasons was refused.
49. A development that should lead to greater stability in Ears is an
agreement between Qavam-ul-Mulk on the one hand and Nasir* Qashgai and his
brothers on the other to the effect that in future they will co-operate with rather
than oppose each other in Ears. The Qavam has made his co-operation dependent
on two conditions : that no action should be taken injurious to the general
interests of Ears and of Persia; that no action shall be taken against British
interests or British wishes. The motives behind this reconciliation are, in the
first place, the Qavam s conviction that he cannot rely on the Government to
protect against the Qashgai such interests as he and his family still have left
in I ars: in the second place, the fear common to all men of property in Persia
of a Russian-sponsored revolution in the north and the resulting desire to create
some stability in the still feudal south that might be developed into some form
of local autonomy; and, in the third place, the hope of being able to present a
united front against a possible return of a tyrannical dictatorship of the Crown
and the army.
50. In Bakhtiari assiduous attempts were made by all Morteza Quli’s
jealous relatives among the khans to aggravate the grounds of complaint,
unimportant in themselves, against his rather autocratic rule. In spite of this
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