خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎٤‎٦] (٢٤٨/٩٢)

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would prefer to increase the British stake in this country; and (c) what basis for
the grant of a concession would be most attractive to them. As to (a), the
Persian Government’s difficulty was apprehension as to the attitude of the
Russians towards the grant of an oil concession. As to (6), there were conflicting
views and it was difficult to judge which would prevail. As to (c), Persian
statesmen, always timorous and suspicious, were particularly so in this case,
where they felt that in technical matters they were at a disadvantage. They''
Persian Government had stated that they must have the advice of
Dr. Millspaugh on the terms offered and Dr. Millspaugh had recom
mended the engagement of technical advisers. These technical advisers,
Messrs. Hoover and Curtice—who are directors of an American firm
which specialises in giving disinterested advice to Governments on the merits
of proposed oil concessions—arrived in July. The Persian Government then
settled down to examine the various proposals thoroughly in collaboration with
a Committee whose numbers the Government—subsequently alarmed by the
suspicious reaction of the Majlis towards concession hunting—continually
increased in an endeavour to cover themselves from every angle. On the
22nd September the Foreign Office observed to this embassy that the United
States Embassy were giving the American companies considerably greater support
than the Foreign Office had supposed. It might be doubtful whether this support
was to the ultimate advantage of the American companies concerned, but it
justified His Majesty’s Government in giving more active support to the Shell
Group should prompt and active intervention be required.
65. Meanwhile, however, the whole matter had been put into the melting
pot owing to the arrival, a few days earlier, from Moscow, of M. Kavtaradze,
an Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, with the scarifying request that
the Persian Government should permit the Soviet Government to prospect for
oil for five years in North Persia and then to take up a concession in such areas
as they might select. The Persian Government were still considering the matter
at the end°of the period under review, with a strong inclination towards post
poning the grant of any oil concessions until after the war.
Locust Control.
66. Throughout the quarter under review Persia was virtually free of
locusts. The hopper campaign during May in Laristan prevented the develop
ment of Desert {i.e., migrating) Locust swarms, and apart from one or two small
bands which crossed and re-crossed to the Indo-Persian frontier no Desert Locusts
entered the country. The final report on the Moroccan {i.e., non-migrating)
Locust campaign, which was received in July, states that Persian and Soviet
parties in Azerbaijan and Gurgan prevented serious damage to crops, but were
unable to forestall widespread egg-laying. The eggs will hatch in spring 1945
and preparations are being made for an extensive campaign with Soviet
participation.
67. Judging from Indian reports there is every prospect that no Desert
Locust swarms will invade Persia from the east during the coming winter. How
ever, the Chief Locust Officer of the Middle East Anti-Locust Unit (who visited
Tehran in September) expects a considerable influx of swarms from Africa into
Arabia during the autumn of 1944 and preparations will have to be made to
protect Persia against invasion from that direction at the beginning of 1945.
The extent of possible British assistance has yet to be fixed.
68. Copies of this despatch are going to the Minister-Resident in Cairo,
His Majesty’s Ambassador in Moscow, to the Government of India and to His
Majesty’s Consular Officers in Persia.
I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.