خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎٤‎٤] (٢٤٨/٨٧)

9
Tribal Situation.
j 35. The tribes of Ears, except for some fighting between sections of the Boir
Ahmadi, have remained remarkably quiet during the period under review.
Brigandage is endemic in Ears, but incidents have been rarer than usual; and
few can be attributed to the Qashgai. There has also been an absence of the
| usual summer raiding by Boir Ahmadi across the Abadeh—Isfahan road and
! into the district of Yazd. Some credit for the unusual order prevailing may
fairly be given to the influence of British officials and to the belief that British
influence in Tehran will be used in favour of these tribes who have not misbehaved.
The pact of friendship to which reference was made in my despatch under
reference between Qavam ul Mulk and Nasir Qashgai, later joined by Morteza
Quli Khan, the Bakhtiari Governor of Bakhtiari, has also contributed to peace by
removing, for the time being at least, some of the causes of unrest that lay in
long-standing mutual antagonisms. This pact has been represented as an alliance
of the tribes of the south. It is hardly that, since Qavam-ul Mulk, although still
retaining some influence among the Khamseh tribes, cannqt be said to be a
tribal leader; he is concerned mainly with the protection against the Qashgai of
the remaining interests of his family in Ears. We are, of course, suspected of
having fathered the pact as part of a plan to form a zone of British influence
in the south in opposition to the supposedly increasing influence of the Russian-
inspired Tudeh party.
36. The Boir Ahmadi tribes of Kuh-i-Galu are at loggerheads with each
other. Since unity between these turbulent tribes usually means trouble for their
neighbours, it is no bad thing in present circumstances that they should work off
their pugnacity on each other, provided that disturbance can be restricted to the
limits of their own territory. The present quarrels arise from the high-handed
actions of Abdullah Khan Zarghampur, a chief of the tribe, an absconder from
Persian detention in Tehran and a close associate of Nasir Qashgai, who has
been attempting to impose himself as paramount chief and to seize land claimed
by other chiefs. The opposition to him is being encouraged by Persian officials,
but, in view of Abdullah Khan’s association with Nasir Qashgai, the necessity
for caution has been impressed on the Persian Government lest the Qashgai
should be driven to intervene, involving other tribes in Ears hostile to them and
so extending disorder beyond the limits of the Boir Ahmadi country.
37. In Bakhtiari rumblings of discontent against Morteza Quli Khan have
continued, but peace has been maintained. Some rather futile operations were
carried out by the Persian army for the disarmament of the Moghui and
Mamivand sections of the Chahar Lang Bakhtiari, most of whom lie outside the
limits of Morteza Quli Khan’s jurisdiction. Some arms were collected, but, it
seems, mostly from the settled elements of the tribes, and the Mamivand nomads
remain in possession of some 2,000-2,500 rifles.
38. In Khuzestan the operation for the disarmament of the disorderly
Arabs of the Ahu Dasht area, which was referred to in my last despatch, was
completed by the Persian forces with unusual efficiency and creditable moderation.
In ali, some 1,000 rifles were collected. A number of Arabs were arrested, and
seven of them were hanged, with good effect on the Arabs in general, who did
not question the justice of the punishment. Both civil and military Persian
officials in Khuzestan are insistent that advantage should be taken of the mood
induced in the Arabs by this display of Persian authority to extend the
collection of arms, of which there are estimated still to be some 6,000-7,000 in
Khuzestan, to other Arab tribes; and they are confident that, given a suitable
show of force, the collection can be made without opposition. Since it is
important for the post-war security of Khuzestan, and particularly of the
interests of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, that the number of unlicensed rifles
in the hands of the Arabs should be reduced, I have raised no objection to the
Bani Turuf being summoned to surrender their arms. My information,
admittedly somewhat conjectural, is that they are likely to make some show of
complying.
39. Kurdistan, particularly that part of it that lies within the Russian
zone of occupation in Persia, has been causing the Persian Government
increasing anxiety. Reports, probably exaggerated, have been reaching Tehran
of Russian encouragement of Kurdish aspirations to autonomy. Persian
suspicions of Russian designs have been intensified by the refusal of the Russians
to allow the Persian Government to maintain in Azerbaijan forces of sufficient
strength to take effective action against Kurdish lawlessness. The popular theory
5 [59—61] c