خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎٤‎١] (٢٤٨/٨٢)

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Majesty’s Government that retaliation alone would cure the present unsatisfactory
situation. His Majesty’s Government approved the policy of retaliation, but
suggested that Mr. Laseelles should first try to induce the Soviet Embassy to
call the battle off, taking the line that censorship of this kind was now out of date
and should be discontinued, and adding a hint that this was a game that two
could play. As a first step, Mr. Lascelles requested the British censor to attempt to
settle the matter with his Soviet colleague on the basis prescribed by the Foreign^
Office. This failed, so Mr. Lascelles took the matter up with the Soviet
Ambassador, pointing out in addition that the discrepancy between their
interpretation and ours was having a most undesirable effect on the Persian
population. It was giving them an entirely one-sided picture of all those
ideological questions on which the Russians and ourselves thought differently
and this could not be allowed to go on. M. Maximov replied that before admitting
that the Soviet censor was being too strict he must have copious examples of his
methods to study, as also examples of the British censor’s more liberal attitude.
His impression was that, on the contrary, British papers and periodicals were
highly critical of the Soviet Union, while Soviet papers and periodicals permitted
themselves no criticism of their Allies. Mr. Lascelles undertook to supply
material on both points. This he did in a letter repeating the points prescribed
by the Foreign Office. As it was evident, however, that the Soviet Ambassador
was playing for time, Mr. Lascelles added that in order to redress the present
unequal balance pending a settlement of the controversy, he had authorised the
British censor to hold up the release of certain Soviet publications which were
unacceptable to the British authorities on the basis of a purely political censorship.
7. Another point of discord was that the Soviet censor, in the course of
September took to vetoing practically all the material provided by the Polish
Legation for their weekly broadcast on Tehran radio.
8. At the end of the period under review the Persian Prime Minister
informed me that he was disturbed about the Soviet attitude and activities. For
instance :—
(a) The Soviet Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs had come to Tehran
to request an oil concession for the Soviet Government in North Persia.
(b) The Soviet Transport Organisation, “Iransovtrans,” was beginning to
operate as though it were a commercial transport company, but was
disregarding Persian transport regulations.
(c) The Soviet authorities had still not given permission for additional
Persian troops to go to Rezaieh, but instead had offered to help
maintain order among the Kurds.
{d) A Soviet hospital and school in Tabriz has been opened without the
permission of the Persian Government having been asked. The school
was allegedly for Soviet children only, but in point of fact Persian
subjects were also accepted. Moreover, Turki was the main language
and Persian only subsidiary.
(Please see also sections entitled “Economic Situation,” “Transport” and
“ Oil Concessions ” for further details of Russian penetration.)
A nglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship.
9. The controversy with the Soviet authorities regarding the condemnation
of publications on ideological grounds is described under the heading “ Soviet
Affairs.”
10. The British authorities concerned are now considering what should
happen to this censorship after Germany’s defeat, and the British Director has
collected the views of the British organisations in Persia interested in the matter.
The view of this embassy is that the interests of the security authorities concerned
will be adequately safeguarded by a censorship covering telegrams and letters
only. Probably, indeed, the censorship of letters could be abandoned without risk,
since the only subjects likely to interest the Japanese are the movements of
shipping in the Persian Gulf and sabotage of the oil-fields, and information on the
former subject must be transmitted rapidly to be of any use. The embassy have,
however, no great objection to the continuance of letter censorship from the
political point of view, and it would have some theoretical justification as long
as Turkey and Afghanistan continue to provide bases for Japanese diplomats.
The embassy are particularly anxious, on the other hand, to abolish the political
and ideological censorship of newspapers and periodicals, since this leads to
Anglo-Russian friction.
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