خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎٤‎٠] (٢٤٨/٨٠)

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| was past praying for. Mr. Lascelles added that the new American Ambassador
had reached the conclusion that no foreign adviser ought to be given the powers
and responsibilities which were entrusted to Dr. Millspaugh, on the grounds
that this stultified the Persian Constitution and was basically incompatible
with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. Dr. Millspaugh should share these
responsibilties with the Majlis; all decrees should be signed jointly by both,
and in the event of disagreement the Prime Minister should decide between
them. At this point, however, Dr. Millspaugh’s obstinacy stood him in good
stead; he refused to go to the United States, fearing some trap to keep him
there and being certain that at best his powers would be reduced during his
absence; he expressed the intention to retire next February after two years’
service, and meanwhile a successor should be brought out soon to be trained by
him. The fact is that lately, owing to the war news, economic developments in
Persia appear to be on the point of taking a favourable turn for Dr. Millspaugh
and he is shrewd enough to see that if he hangs on for a few more months he
may leave with much less discredit than now.
4. The future of all the American Advisory Missions was under review
during the present period. The United States Charge d’Affaires told
Mr. Lascelles at the beginning of August that the United States Government
were extremely irritated by the lack of Persian co-operation with the missions
and might withdraw them before long. His Majesty’s Government thereupon
explained to the United States Government that they were most anxious for
the American Missions to remain, and in certain cases to be strengthened, since
they were convinced that Persia’s need for foreign assistance would continue
to be great, particularly in the immediate post-war period; they were especially
concerned about the future of the Persian police; when Allied troops are with-
J drawn a large measure of responsibility for internal security would fall on the
police, which, in its present state, was quite unable to bear it; this might have
particularly serious consequences in the oil area. His Majesty’s Government
were anxious, therefore, that reforms should be put in hand before the departure
of British troops. These could not be carried out without foreign assistance
and they would prefer that this should be provided by the United States, if
possible; if, however, the United States Government felt unable to provide it,
His Majesty’s Government would have to consider advising the Persian
Government to look elsewhere. His Majesty’s Government added that if the
American Military Mission was going to be withdrawn, the Anglo-American
plan for the supply of equipment for the Persian army would need to be
reconsidered. The State Department replied that the United States Govern
ment were not losing interest in Persia, but they had no fixed policy of retaining
advisory missions there. They had, for instance, always made it clear to the
Persian Government that American advisers must not be exposed to vilification :
if attacked, the Persian Government must defend them, otherwise they would
be withdrawn and would not be replaced. The following decisions had been
recently taken by the United States Government:—
(1) Colonel Schwarzkopf and his five assistants would be left for a further
year with the gendarmerie.
(2) Instructions would be sent to the United States Ambassador in Tehran
to investigate whether Colonel Schwarzkopf might take over the
police as well.
(3) General Ridley would remain until the 1st March, 1945, by which date
the War Department thought that he would have done all he could
to accomplish his task; the War Department would probably decline
to appoint a successor and were inclined to concentrate on the
gendarmerie and police.
His Majesty’s Charge d’Afiaires’ comment on these decisions was that
Colonel Schwarzkopf could not take over the police unless he obtained five
additional men of his own choosing; he had, however, been told that he could not
have them while the war lasted. Mr. Lascelles added that General Ridley would
not have accomplished by the 1st March, 1945, all the work covered by his contract.
This work comprised the drawing up of plans of organisation under numerous
heads and supervising their execution; and under the majority of these heads
even the planning stage had not been reached. In the opinion of the military
attach^ to his embassy such work as General Ridley had achieved would rapidly
be undone if he left next spring. Mr. Lascelles went on to discuss how far the
possession of an efficient army would really be useful and necessary to Persia
in post-war conditions, given a reformed and larger gendarmerie. As long as
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