خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎٣‎٥] (٢٤٨/٧٠)

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censor was to reiterate the suggestion that both parties should cease to conduct^
political censorship.
21. The question now arises whether the British organisations concerned
should or should not put on the Persian market copies of publications condemned
by the Soviet censor, which reach them by channels not liable to censorship
(e.g., by diplomatic bag). This embassy expressed the view to the Foreign Office
that the Public Relations Bureau should not sell such publications in their own^
shops, but it seemed a pity to forbid their distribution to private booksellers, as
the Soviet censor had by now condemned a wide range of publications, mostly on
preposterous grounds, and many of them standard works. The instructions of
His Majesty’s Government on this point are awaited.
22. The American Embassy in turn are now worried at the large proportion
of American newspapers and periodicals which fail to reach American
subscribers in Persia, and they unofficially informed this embassy that they were
thinking of reporting to their Government that this was presumably due to the
Soviet censor. This embassy replied that they understood the anxiety of the
American Embassy, and that, for reasons of their own, they would not regret it
if the matter was brought to the attention of the United States Government.
23. The Soviet censor has slashed unmercifully the material submitted by
the Polish Legation for broadcasting in the time allotted to them by Tehran Radio,
so much so that often their programme had to be confined to gramophone records.
To restore the balance, the British censor was requested by this embassy to cut
objectionable material from the material submitted for broadcasting by the Soviet-
sponsored Polish Patriots. The Soviet authorities countered this by broadcasting
the whole of the Polish Patriots’ material without submitting it for censorship,
prefacing the broadcast with an announcement that it was given under the
auspices of the Soviet Embassy (and consequently not liable to censorship).
Security.
24. There are signs that the Soviet authorities are planning to use as agents
some of the Persians interned for activities directed against the Allies.
25. The Persian internees are divided into those who are mainly a British
and those who are mainly a Soviet concern. The British authorities allowed the
Soviet authorities to take to Resht for interrogation two Persians on the British
list; the Mullah Kashani, who is perhaps the most important and most dangerous
of the Sultanabad internees, and Naubakht, who also played an important part
in the plot against the Allies. It was noted with surprise that the Soviet officers
who returned them to the British security authorities treated them with the
greatest consideration, shaking hands with them and parting with them on the
most friendly terms. Kashani expresses the greatest detestation of the British
and says openly that when he is released he will do us all the harm he can. He
would make an ideal Soviet agent.
26. Neither side releases any internee without the concurrence of the other.
The Soviet Embassy recently sent to this embassy their first list of internees whom
they proposed to release. Among the names was that of General Aghevli, who
at the time of his arrest was commanding the gendarmerie. For some time the
Soviet security officers had been trying, without success, to persuade the British
security officers that Aghevli had not taken any serious part in anti-Ally
activities. The attitude of the British security officers was that both written
and oral evidence showed conclusively that Aghevli held a key position in the
plot, and this, combined with his intelligence and his official position, made him
a most dangerous enemy of the Allies. This embassy therefore felt bound to
refuse his release, giving the above reasons, and adding that, if his name had not
been on the Soviet list, we should have put him on ours. There is no doubt that
the Soviets expect assistance from Aghevli if he is released, in return for their
unexpected and undeserved leniency.
27. A number of the less important Persians on the British list of suspects
have been released, with Soviet consent, during the period under review. Piqued,
however, by our refusal to release General Aghevli, the Soviet Embassy refused
to allow this embassy to release four unimportant suspects, alleging that they
were highly dangerous. This embassy replied that, in view of the Soviet
Embassy’s objections, these men would not be released, but took the opportunity
of pointing out that it would not have submitted their names to the Soviet
Embassy if the British security authorities had not previously ascertained from
the Soviet security authorities that there was no objection from' the Soviet side
to their release; it was unfortunate that the Soviet security authorities had failed,
apparently, to keep their embassy fully informed in this matter.