خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [و‎‎٣‎٥] (٢٤٨/٦٩)

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-^criticism of Russian policy and methods in Persia which caused a great impression
and sent Seyid Zia’s stock up considerably.
18. Kavtaradze left Tehran for Moscow on the 9th December but he had
previously informed the Prime Minister of the Soviet Government’s displeasure
at the Oil Bill which, he said, the Majlis would do well to reconsider. Meanwhile
Russian propaganda was intensified among all classes and even in the schools.
There were further Tudeh demonstrations in Maragheh, Shahpur and Tabriz and
trouble in a factory in Shahi where some workmen were reported to have been
killed. I he year ended in an atmosphere of growing uneasiness and uncertainty
as regards Russian intentions in North Persia where they had already begun
to exercise a considerable measure of direct political control 1 .
Soviet Affairs.
19. In connexion with the oil dispute, this embassy suggested to the Foreign
Office that discussions should be held as to the possibility of withdrawing British
forces at least from Tehran as soon as war material and goods despatched to
the Soviet Union from overseas were diverted to some other route in Persia. There
were many complications, e.g., the arrangement to send a large quantity of
aviation spirit from Abadan to the Soviet Union until the middle of 1945;" the
fact that the presence of Royal Air Force personnel in Tehran enabled the
British authorities concerned to maintain their connexion with the Persian Air
Force &nd aircraft factory, and to supply the necessary technical services for
the British Airways line to Tehran. On the other hand, withdrawal offered several
advantages : (1) if the British evacuated Tehran, the Soviet authorities must
either do the same or expose themselves as less considerate than the British.
(2) the evacuation of Tehran by the foreign troops would in itself strengthen
the Persian Government. (3) if the touchiness of the Soviet authorities was due
m part to the suspicion of British motives (as it probably was) an offer on our part
to evacuate Tehran, and perhaps other places, might'help to calm them down,
even if at first they did attribute the offer to a wish to remove Soviet influence
from the capital. His Majesty’s Embassy pointed out in addition that in a
number of cases actions which seemed innocent enough to the doers aroused
profound suspicion in the Soviet mind, e.g., attempts made by British parties
during the fiist year of occupation to enter the Soviet “ zone ” to make surveys
or reconnaissances. Moreover, the defenders of the Soviet Government’s demand
foi an oil concession represented it as prompted by the manoeuvre of capitalist
concession hunters in Persia. However mistaken, and even dishonest Soviet
accusations m such matters might be, His Majesty’s Government should consider
seriously all possible causes of suspicion with a view to their elimination or
diminution wherever possible. (Possible innocent causes of Soviet suspicion are
the continued maintenance by the British authorities of the 300 mile road from
Zahidan to Kerman and the 600 mile road from Zahidan to Meshed, and the
completion of the Kerman aerodrome, although aid to Russia by the East Persia
route has ceased and the danger of a German attack from the Caucasus has
passed.)
A nglo-Soviet-Persian Censorship.
r Uv 2 ?; dlffi( : ulti 1 es with the Soviet authorities over the political censorship
ot books and periodicals continued and, indeed, increased during the period under
review. In spite of reminders the Soviet Ambassador did not reply to the protest
sent b\ Mr. Lascelles on the subject in September, and the Soviet censor extended
his activities against British publications. Previously he had been opening
paicels addressed to the British Council and to booksellers, c/o the Public
Relations Buieau, British Embassy. Early in December, however the Soviet
censor complained that the Public Relations Bureau were selling at their premises
copies of publications condemned by him. He therefore gave notice that he would
examine all parcels addressed to the Public Relations Bureau direct This
embassy thereupon requested the British censor to inform his Soviet colleague
that the publications in question would be withdrawn, but at the same time^ to
protest against the examining of parcels addressed to the Public Relations
Bureau, which was an integral part of the embassy and covered by diplomatic
privilege The Soviet censor, however, refused to abstain, so this embassy
requested the British censor to express regret to his Soviet colleague that so lono-
as the latter continued this practice, the British censor would examine all parcels
ad fhe Soviet Trade Delegation (who are the main channel through
which Russian publications are put on the Persian market and for whom the
Soviet authorities claim diplomatic privilege). At the same time the British