خارجي ٤١/٥٠٠١ "بلاد فارس - الشؤون الداخلية (إرساليات متنوعة)". [ظ‎‎٢‎٦] (٢٤٨/٥٢)

4
Kingdom and British Dominions, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United States. . . -n - 4 -- i. -a
16. Meanwhile retaliatory pressure was maintained on the British side.
This was never comparable to the Russian censorship activity in extent, and was
indeed confined largely to the protection of the Polish Government in London
from the more outrageous of Soviet slanders. It involved, however, the holding
up of several issues of the Pravda and one of the actions which t e ^
Soviet Ambassador evidently regarded as unspeakably shocking and dithcuit to
explain to his colony without loss of face. Although the Soviet section of the
censorship and the Soviet Embassy had met all protests on our side with a con-
sistant refusal to justify or explain their actions, M. Maximov protested strongly
against these British counter-measures and demanded explanations. He was
merely informed that his protests had been referred to London.
17 On the 6th March the Soviet censor agreed orally to the proposals
described above, and large quantities of British, American and Russian printed
matter, previously held up, were thereupon released. He announced moreover his
intention of interpreting his responsibilities liberally m respect of publications in
languages other than English and Russian, with the possible exception of 1 oils .
So far he has been as good as his word, and we have followed suit. Relations
between the British and Soviet censors were immediately restored to the highest
level of cordiality, the Russians, true to their national psychology, having accepted
defeat without the slightest trace of resentment. • * a u
18 Unsuccessful attempts were made to extract from the Soviet Ambassador
a written acceptance of the British proposal. It is always very difficult to get
anything in writing from the Soviet authorities, but M. Maximov was probably
embarrassed by the fact that he had stipulated in conversation for the continued
suppression of attacks on Heads of States (a stipulation to which there is of course
no objection so long as it is reasonably interpreted), and did not wish to put this
point in writing because—presumably—it was not contained in his mstructio ^
P 19 It proved impossible, during the period under review, to obtain a
square deal for the Polish legation in the matter of broadcasting over ^e Tehran
radio the Russians continued to reject the legation’s material submitted for
censorship and to evade censorship of the so-called Polish Patriots’ radio propa
ganda by sponsoring it themselves. Until the closing down of British broad
casting from the Tehran station it might have been possible to redress the balance
bv copying the Soviet Embassy’s methods; but the increasingly difficult attitude
adopted b? the Polish Government after the Yalta Conference made it inadvisable
to adopt a form of drastic retaliation which would m any case have been effective
for a short period only. The Poles, however, discovered a soiutmn of their own
when the British broadcasts from Tehran ceased They found t^tthePersiaii
radio authorities were willing to allow the Poles to broadcast official Polish
*“ hat h . ld not been censored by the Russians (or by the British) and two
or three such bulletins have in fact been broadcast without the Russians raising
any objection. The Poles have promised not to be provocative, so we are turni g
a blind eye to the broadcasts.
Aid to Russia.
20. The total “Aid to Russia’’
review was :—
January—
Rail
Trucks
February—
Rail
Trucks
March—*
Rail
Trucks
cargo carried during the period under
Long tons.
102,009
36,603
138,612
83,779
50,728
134,507
60,766
20,927
81,693
trucks plus their
The tonnages shown for trucks are the weight of the assembled
cargo.
t 4
*
J
■ £